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CHANCERY PRACTICE ON THE 
AMERICAN FRONTIERt 
A STUDY OF THE RECORDS OF THE SUPREME COURT 
OF MICHIGAN TERRITORY, 1805-1836 
William Wirt Blume* 
49 
THE act of Congress of January 11, 1805,1 which created Michigan Territory out of Indiana Territory, provided that 
the new territory should have a government "in all respects sim-
ilar" to that provided for the Northwest Territory by the Ordi-
nance of 1787. The Ordinance had provided for the appoint-
ment of a court to consist of three judges who should have "a 
common law jurisdiction. "2 Subsequent to the Ordinances of 
1784 and 1785 at least four plans of government were submitted 
to the Congress of the Confederation before the Ordinance of 
July 13, 1787, was :finally adopted: 
Plan of May 10, 1786: "There shall also be appointed a 
Court, to consist of five Members who shall have a common 
law and chancery jurisdiction."3 
Plan of July 13, 1786: "There shall also be appointed a 
Court, to consist of five judges, who shall have a common law 
and chancery jurisdiction."4 
Plan of September 19, 1786: "There shall also be ap-
pointed a Court, to consist of five judges, who shall have a 
common law and chancery jurisdiction."5 
Plan of April 26, 1787~ as amended and ordered to a 
third reading on May 10, 1787: "There shall also be ap-
t This is the fourth of a series of articles dealing with law on the American frontier. 
The first of the series, Civil Procedure on the American Frontier (A study of the records 
of a court of common pleas of the Northwest and Indiana Territories 1796-1805), was pub-
lished in 56 MICH. L. REv. 161 (1957); the second, Criminal Procedure on the American 
Frontier (A study of the statutes and court records of Michigan Territory 1805-1825) ap-
peared in 57 MICH, L. REv. 195 (1958); the third, Probate and Administration on the 
American Frontier (A study of the probate records of ·wayne County-Northwest Territory 
1796-1803; Indiana Territory 1803-1805; Michigan Territory 1805-1816) appeared in 58 
MICH, L. REv. 209 (1959). The fifth article of the series dealing with frontier legislation 
is in the process of being written. An article by the same author dealing with court organ-
ization on the American frontier was published in 38 MICH. L. REv. 289 (1940) under the 
title Circuit Courts and the Nisi Prius System: The Making of an Appellate Court. 
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
1 2 Stat. 309. 
2 I Stat. 51 (1789) (note). 
8 30 JOURNALS OF THE CoNTJNENTAL CoNGRF.55 253 (1934). 
4/d. at 404. 
l> 31 id. 670. 
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pointed a Court, to consist of three judges, any two of whom 
shall form a Court, who shall have a common law jurisdic-
tion."6 
Why the words "and chancery" were omitted from the plan 
of April 26 and from the Ordinance, as finally adopted, cannot 
be established with certainty, but it can be established that the 
New England "adventurers" who composed the land company 
known as the Ohio Company were greatly interested in the form 
of government that was to be provided for the Northwest Terri-
tory, and through their agent, Manasseh Cutler, suggested amend-
ments to the plan of April 26 which were readily accepted by 
Congress. 
March 16, 1787, some eight days after he had been chosen 
one of the three directors of the Ohio Company,7 Cutler ·wrote 
as follows to Nathan Dane:8 
"There being a large number of persons who intend to 
be adventurers in company, in this part of Massachusetts 
and in New Hampshire, provided a purchase of lands can 
be made that will be agreeable to them, I beg leave to ad-
dress you on the subject. General Parsons will make applica-
tion to Congress, in the name of the other directors, in order 
to make the purchase for the company, and will propose 
terms which have been agreed to by the other directors .... 
"If the lands could be immediately purchased on the 
terms the Company proposes, we have the fullest assurance 
that the subscription for one million dollars will be com-
pleted in a short time. Many of the subscribers are men of 
very considerable property and respectable characters, who 
intend (for the Company admit no other) to become resi-
dents in that country. The spirit of emigration never ran 
higher with us than at this time, owing in a great measure, 
to the general stagnation of business. If they are disappointed 
in their expectations westward, will turn their attention to 
some other quarter .... 
"We should be happy in obtaining your influence in 
favor of the Company, and have the fullest confidence of 
your readiness to second the wishes of so large a number 
of the inhabitants of the New England States, so far as is 
consistent with the general interest of the Union." 
6 5 WESTERN LAw JOURNAL 535; 2 ST. CLAIR PAPERS 608 (Smith ed.). 
7 1 THE RECORDS OF THE ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE OHIO COIIIPANY 12 (Hulbert ed.) 
(Marietta College Hist. Col. 1917). 
81 LIFE- JOURNALS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF R.Ev. MANASSEH CUTI.ER LL.D., 194 0'{. P. 
and J.P. Cutler eds. 1888) (hereinafter cited CUTI.ER PAPERS). 
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Dane, also a citizen of Massachusetts, was a member of the com-
mittee of Congress charged with the task of proposing a plan of 
government for the western territory. It seems significant that 
the plan of April 26 was amended and ordered to a third reading 
just one day after the Ohio Company's purchase proposal was 
read in Congress May 9, 1787 .9 
The influence of the Ohio Company, and the desire of a 
financially hard-pressed Congress to establish a government ac-
ceptable to the New England adventurers, are shown by the fol-
lowing extracts from Cutler's journal: 
"July 10, 1787:10 This morning another conference with 
the committee. . . . As Congress was now engaged in settling 
the form of government for the Federal Territory, for which 
a bill had been prepared, and a copy sent to me, with leave 
to make remarks and propose amendments, and which I had 
taken the liberty to remark upon, and to propose several 
amendments, I thought this the most favorable opportunity 
to go on to Philadelphia. Accordingly, after I had returned 
the bill with my observations, I set out at 7 o'clock. 
"July 19, 1787:11 Called on members of Congress very 
early in the morning. Was furnished with the Ordinance 
establishing a Government in the Western Federal Terri-
tory. It is in a degree new modeled. The amendments I 
proposed have all been made, except one."12 
July 16, 1787, Dane gave Rufus King the following account 
of what had been going on in Congress the preceding 10 or 12 
days: 13 
"We have been employed about several objects - the 
principal ones of which have been the Government inclosed, 
and the Ohio Purchase. The former you will see is com-
pleted, and the latter will be probably completed to-morrow. 
We tried one day to patch up M.S.P. systems of W. Govern't. 
Started new ideas, and committed the whole to Carrington, 
Dane, R. H. Lee, Smith, and Kean. We met several times, 
1> 1 RECORDS OF nn: Omo COMPANY, supra, note 7, at I-Ii. 
10 1 CUTLER PAPERS 239 and 242. 
11 Id. at 293. 
12 The following are only a few of the accounts of Cutler's activities as agent of the 
Ohio Company: POOLE, THE ORDINANCE OF 1787, AND DR. MANASSEH CUTLER AS AN AGENT 
IN rrs FORMATION (1876); CUTLER, THE ORDINANCE OF JULY 13, 1787 (1887); The Influence 
Extended by Dr. Cutler in the Formation of the Ordinance, I CUTLER PAPERS 335; Chaney, 
Nathan Dane, 3 THE GREEN BAG 548 (1891); STONE, THE ORDINANCE OF 1787 (1889); The 
Ohio Company, I RECORDS OF nn: OHIO COMPANY, supra note 7, at xlvii et seq.; BROWN, 
MANASSEH CUTLER AND TIIE SETTLEMENT OF Omo 1788 (1938). 
131 CUTLER PAPERS 371. 
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and at last agreed on some principles, at least Lee, Smith, 
and myself. We found ourselves rather pressed; the Ohio 
Company appeared to purchase a large tract of Federal lands 
- about 6 or 7 millions of acres; and we wanted to abolish 
the old system, and get a better one for the Government of 
the country - and we finally found it necessary to adopt the 
best system we could get. . .. When I drew the Ordinance, 
which passed (a few words excepted) as I originally formed 
it, I had no idea the States would agree to the sixth art. 
prohibiting slavery, as only Massa. of the Eastern States was 
present, and therefore omitted it in the draft; but finding 
the House favorably disposed on this subject, after we had 
completed the other parts, I moved the art., which was agreed 
to without opposition. We are in a fair way to fix the terms 
of our Ohio sale, etc.; we have been upon it steadily for 
three days. The magnitude of the purchase makes us very 
cautious about the terms of it, and the security necessary to 
insure the performance of them."14 
Many years later Dane stated that the Ordinance had been 
framed by him mainly from the laws of Massachusetts, especially 
in regard to titles.15 He did not, however, explain why the 
words "and chancery" were omitted from the plan of April 26, 
1787. Referring to the colonial charters he wrote:16 
"And it is not understood that these charters actually for-
bade courts of equity to be established in any, or that they 
absolutely prohibited an English chancery code distinct from 
the common law, or calculated generally to ameliorate the 
rigour of it to be introduced into their jurisprudence. But 
those who framed these charters, as well as those who received 
them, seem to have been in general not much disposed to 
establish such a code; but some in this respect to do more, 
some less, and some, as in New England and Pennsylvania, 
nothing, but only to vest in the law courts, with jealousy, 
and by little and little, powers in equity to soften the unyield-
ing spirit of the law, as stated briefly in former chapters, es-
pecially those in which mortgages, conditions, penalties, 
forfeitures, and trusts, have been considered. . . . On the 
whole, there was a court of chancery for a very short time in 
Rhode Island, but its arbitrary conduct soon caused its dis-
continuance. Attempts were made to establish such a court 
14 For accounts of Dane's activities, see discussions listed in note 12 supra, except the 
last, especially Chaney's article in The Green Bag. 
15 8 DANE, A GENERAL .ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW 390 (1824). 
16 7 id. at 518. 
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in Massachusetts, but failed .... No powers in equity were 
especially provided for in the old confederation." 
53 
Arthur St. Clair, the first governor of the Northwest Terri-
tory, immediately recognized the significance of the omission of 
the words "and chancery" from the Northwest Ordinance. In 
1788 in a letter to judges Parsons and Varnum he wrote:17 
"As Judges, you are clothed with a common-Law Juris-
diction, which is, at once, both descriptive & restrictive; -
restrictive of any Powers in Equity." 
St. Clair was president of the Confederation at the time the Ordi-
nance of 1787 was adopted, but was not present on the day it 
was passed. His appointment as governor was due, at least in 
part, to the support of the Ohio Company given in the hope, 
if not expectation, that he would support the Company.18 Hav-
ing served as a judge of common pleas and quarter sessions in 
Pennsylvania,10 St. Clair was fully familiar with the New England 
scheme, also employed in Pennsylvania, of administering equity 
through common law forms. Judge Parsons was one of the three 
directors of the Ohio Company chosen March 8, 1787,20 and 
had represented the Company in making its application to Con-
gress in May 1787.21 He was a graduate of Harvard, and had 
practiced law in Connecticut.22 Judge Varnum had been named 
a director of the Ohio Company in August 1787.23 A graduate 
of Brown, he had practiced law in Rhode Island.24 Rufus Putnam 
of Massachusetts, one of the three directors of the Ohio Company 
chosen in 1787,25 was appointed a judge of the Northwest Terri-
tory in 1790.26 Winthrop Sargent of Massachusetts, secretary of 
the Ohio Company when Cutler, Parsons, and Putnam were 
named as directors,27 was Secretary of the Northwest Territory, 
17 3 TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES 277 (Carter ed. 1934); 2 THE ST. CLAIR 
PAPERS 76 (Smith ed. 1882). 
18 According to Hulbert, Cutler, as agent of the Ohio Company, favored General Par-
sons as governor of the proposed western territory; but when he saw it was good politics 
to favor General St. Clair "he did so immediately and frankly - for the good of the cause 
he represented." RECORDS OF nm OHIO COMPANY, op. cit. supra, note 7, at lix. St. Clair 
owned one share in the Company. Id. at 49, note 57. 
10 LAWS OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORY 1788-1800, xvii (Pease ed. 1925). 
20 RECORDS OF nm OHIO CoMPANY, op. cit. supra, note 7, at 12. 
21 Id. at 1-li. 
22 LAws OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORY 1788-1800, xvii (Pease ed. 1925). 
28 RECORDS OF THE OHIO COMPANY, op. cit. supra, note 7, at 17. 
2¼ LAws OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORY 1788-1800, xvii (Pease ed. 1925). 
25 RECORDS OF TIIE OHIO COMPANY, op. cit. supra, note 7, at 12. 
26 Id. at 1. 
21 Ibid. 
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and served as governor whenever Governor St. Clair was absent 
from the Territory. The governor or acting governor and the 
three judges, or a majority of them, had power, under the Ordi-
nance, to adopt laws for the Territory from the original states. 
This method of legislating was in operation in the Territory 
through 1798. 
While it does not appear that the restriction on the exercise 
of chancery powers set out in the Ordinance was intended to apply 
to inferior courts established in the territory, the legislative au-
thority of the Territory did not attempt to establish a court of 
chancery or confer on the common law courts powers similar to 
equity powers except for enforcement of mortgages,28 for relief 
from penalties and forfeitures,29 for accounting before arbitra-
tors,30 for speedy assignment of dower,31 for partition,32 and for 
limited discovery.33 An orphans' court, patterned after that of 
Pennsylvania, was given such equity powers as were necessary for 
the exercise of its jurisdiction.34 At no time in the Northwest 
Territory was there a system of procedure that could be called 
chancery practice.35 
In contrast with the Ordinance, the Constitution of the United 
States which was being patiently drafted at Philadelphia at the 
time the Ordinance was being hastily passed at New York, pro-
vided that the judicial power of the United States should extend 
"to all cases, in law and equity" arising under the Constitution, 
laws, and treaties of the United States.36 The Federal Judiciary 
Act of 1789 provided that the circuit courts of the United States 
should have original cognizance "of all suits of a civil nature at 
law or in equity" where the dispute should exceed $500 "and 
the United States are plaintiffs or petitioners,"37 but that a suit 
in equity should not be sustained in any case where a "plain, 
adequate and complete remedy" might be had at law.88 The 
28 LAWS OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORY 1788-1800, 134 (Pease ed. 1925) (adopted from 
Pennsylvania). 
29 Id. at 246 ("A Law giving remedies in equity in certain cases," adopted from Massa-
chusetts). 
30 Id. at 354. 
81 Id. at 244 (adopted from Massachusetts). 
S2Id. at 260 (adopted from New York). 
ss 1 THE STATUTES OF Omo AND OF THE NORTHWESTERN TERRITORY 341 (Chase ed. 1833). 
34 LAws OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORY 1788-1800, 181 (Pease ed. 1925). 
85 The federal courts had equity jurisdiction, but no such court sat in the Northwest 
Territory except for a very brief time. See act of Congress approved February 13, 1801; 
repealed March 8, 1802. 
ss Art. III, §2. 
37 l Stat. 73, §11 (1789). 
38Id., §16. 
1960] CHANCERY ON THE AMERICAN FRONTIER 55 
District Court of Kentucky District was given jurisdiction not 
only of district court cases, but of all other causes, except ap-
peals and writs of error, cognizable in a circuit court.39 By an 
act approved March 3, 1805, Congress provided:40 
"The superior courts of the several territories of the 
United States, in which a district court has not been es-
tablished by law, shall, in all cases in which the United States 
are concerned, have and exercise, within their respective ter-
ritories, the same jurisdiction and powers which are by law 
given to, or may be exercised by the district court of Ken-
tucky district." 
Under this statute the Supreme Court of Michigan Territory, 
which held its first session July 29, 1805, had original jurisdiction 
of all suits at law or in equity where the dispute exceeded $500 
and the United States was plaintiff or petitioner. In all other 
cases the court had only the jurisdiction conferred by the organic 
act of January 11, 1805,41 which was the "common law" juris-
diction provided by the Ordinance of 1787. 
Notwithstanding the clear intent of Congress to limit the juris-
diction of the territorial courts created by Congress to a "com-
mon law" jurisdiction plus equity jurisdiction in cases in which 
the United States should be plaintiff or petitioner, the governor 
and judges of Michigan Territory, as a local legislature, July 24, 
1805, adopted a law "concerning the Supreme Court of the Ter-
ritory of Michigan" which provided:42 
"That the supreme court shall have original and exclu-
sive jurisdiction of all cases, both in law and equity, where 
the title of land is in question; original and concurrent juris-
diction in all cases where the sum, or matter in dispute, ex-
ceeds two hundred dollars; and appellate jurisdiction in all 
cases whatsoever. The said court shall have original and 
exclusive jurisdiction of all criminal cases, where the punish-
ment is capital, and of all cases of divorce and alimony. 
"That the judges of the supreme court shall have power, 
in term and in vacation, to allow ·writs of injunction and 
certiorari. 
"That the supreme court in session, or any two judges 
thereof in vacation, may grant ·writs of ne exeat, to prevent 
the departure of any person out of the country. 
89 Id., §10. 
40 2 Stat. 338 (1805). 
41 Note 1 supra. 
421 L\ws OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN (reprint) 9 (1871). 
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"That suits in equity shall not be sustained in any case, 
where adequate remedy may be had at law; and in the trial 
of cases in equity, oral testimony, and examination of wit-
nesses in open court, shall be admitted." 
Whether by this statute the local legislature intended to confer 
on the court created by Congress full chancery powers in terri-
torial cases is not entirely clear. But if any doubt existed it was 
removed by laws adopted in 1812 which purported to confer on 
the court jurisdiction in all cases of divorce and alimony,43 and 
of "all matters in equity.''44 
That the territorial governor and judges as a legislature had 
power to confer equity jurisdiction on inferior courts established 
by them is arguable, if not entirely clear. According to Judge 
Bates, the district courts created by act of July 25, 1805,45 pos-
sessed a jurisdiction "both equitable and legal."46 County courts, 
first established in 1815, were given jurisdiction of certain civil 
cases "both in law and equity."47 An act adopted June 13, 1818, 
provided that the county courts should have "jurisdiction in all 
cases properly cognizable by a court of chancery."48 
An anonymous writer, "Rousseau," in a communication pub-
lished in the Detroit Gazette December 5, 1817, stated: 
"The ordinance . . . declares 'There shall be appointed 
a Court, to consist of three Judges, who shall have a common 
law jurisdiction.' Is it not plain that no other but a com-
mon law jurisdiction is granted? and that this jurisdiction 
can only be enlarged by the same authority which granted 
it? ... I therefore protest against the right of the legislative 
board ... to vest this court with any powers at all .... But 
our Judges, forsooth, not content with legitimate powers -
powers adequate to every useful purpose, usurp such as are 
not granted, erect themselves by a law of their own passing, 
into a Supreme Court, - by another, giving themselves 'juris-
diction in all cases of divorce and alimony' and by another, 
'of all matters of equity.'" 
Similar statements by the same writer will be found in the 
Gazette of December 26, 1817. William Woodbridge, Secretary 
43 Id. at 183. 
44 Ibid. For text of act see 8 MICHIGAN PIONEER COLI.ECTIONS 617. 
45 Id. at 17. 
46 Blume, The First Charge to the Grand Jury in the District Court of Michilimackinac, 
15 MICH. ST. B.J. •344, •346 (1935). 
47 1 LAws OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN (reprint) 184 (1871). 
48 2 id. at 132 (1874). 
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of the Territory, in a letter to Solomon Sibley, Delegate to Con-
gress, November 11, 1820, remarked: "Judge Griffin now ex-
presses doubts whether, without an act of Congress, the Supreme 
Court can entertain jurisdiction of Chancery Cases."49 In 1823, 
after the territorial judges had exercised equity powers some 
eighteen years, Congress provided that the judges of Michigan 
should possess "a chancery, as well as common law, jurisdiction."50 
The "Three Sides" of the Supreme Court 
Rules adopted by the territorial Supreme Court April 24, 
1821, provided:51 
"Art. III, Sec. 4: That there shall be a special docket, 
comprehending all the civil cases and business depending 
on the common law side of the court. 
"Art. X, Sec. 2: That all the cases depending on the equity 
side of the court, shall be placed upon a separate docket, to 
be styled the CHANCERY DocKET; and cases of Divorce and 
Alimony shall be carried to such docket. 
"Art. XI, Sec. 2: That the clerk of the court, on the ad-
miralty side, shall make and keep a docket of all the cases 
depending on that side of the court." 
The records of the "admiralty side" of the court were first 
separated from the other records of the court in 1815;52 the 
equity records, in 1819.r,3 According to a rule adopted in 181554 
the court on the "admiralty side·• was to be attended by the 
United States attorney and the United States marshal (appointed 
by the President under an act of Congress) and by a clerk ap-
pointed by the court. The "admiralty side" was to sit on certain 
days "exclusively for the transaction of business as a circuit and 
district court of the United States."55 Though the court on its 
"admiralty side" was not a court "of the United States,"56 and 
the bulk of its business on that side not "admiralty,"57 the prac-
49 SmLEY PAPERS, Burton Historical Collection, Public Library, Detroit. 
r;o 3 Stat. 769 (1823). 
1512 TRANSACI"IONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF TIIE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 1814-1824, 
517, 525, 526 (Blume ed. 1938) (hereinafter cited TRANsAcrIONs]. 
1521d. at 46. 
158 Id. at 162. 
M[d. at 46. 
155Ibid. 
56 I TRANSAcrIONS (1805-1814) XXXV (1935). 
151 Id. at xlviii. 
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tice of separate sittings and records was continued to the end 
of the territorial government (1836).58 
An examination of the records of the Supreme Court sitting 
as "a circuit and district court,"59 or, more accurately, sitting as 
a territorial court for the trial of cases which concerned the United 
States, discloses an almost complete absence of chancery business. 
Of 310 cases and matters which concerned the United States 
only one was for equitable relief - injunction against interfering 
with the working of a government road.00 The most numerous 
United States cases (more than a third of the total) were libels 
to condemn property seized by the collector of customs. Actions 
of debt were second in number; criminal prosecutions, third. 
Many of the seizures of property were on land, and it may be 
questioned whether the proceedings for penalties and forfeitures 
in these cases were admiralty business, at all.61 Maybe "ex-
58 A court rule adopted May 4, 1831, provided that "the style of the Supreme Court 
acting under the authority of the act entitled 'An act to extend jurisdiction in certain cases 
to the Territorial Courts' shall from and after the first day of the present term be as fol-
lows to wit: 'At a session of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Michigan sitting as a 
District Court of the United States held at the Court House in the City of Detroit pursuant 
to law on the ______ day of _____ &c.' " It was further ordered that all 
process issuing from the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court embracing or relating to 
the business of the United States by the act above mentioned should be issued "in & under 
the style aforesaid.'' 2 TRANSACTIONS (1825-1836) 417 (1940). 
59 When examined, these records were in the Record Room of the federal courts, De-
troit. A calendar of all but a few of the United States cases will be found in I TRANS· 
ACTIONS (1825-1836) 181-236 (1940). 
60 Id. at 198. 
61 According to an editorial printed in the Michigan Herald (Detroit) March 29, 1826, 
a committee of Congress had reported doubt whether the judges of the Michigan Supreme 
Court possessed "admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," adding: "Legally speaking, however, 
there are no admiralty or maritime causes in the Territory." The editors commented as fol-
lows: "The judges of the Supreme Court have at present all the powers intended to be given 
them by the committee. They have jurisdiction in all cases where the United States is a 
party, which includes not only 'causes affecting the revenue, navigation and trade of the 
United States,' but some other classes of cases which it is not necessary to specify. This juris-
diction has always been exercised by the court. The only real extension of the power by 
the proposed law, is the authority to hold special sessions. The court heretofore refused 
to hold extra sessions, except where articles seized for a violation of the revenue laws, are 
represented to be of a perishable nature. ·we refer those who may have a curiosity to 
examine into the extent of the powers conferred on the superior courts of the several terri-
tories, as District Court of the United States, to the act of Congress of 3d March, 1805, U.S. 
Laws, vol. 2, p. 664. The act referred to, prescribing the powers exercised by the District 
Court of Kentucky, will be found in vol. 2, p. 60. "\Ve are unwilling to admit the correctness 
of the position assumed by the committee, that 'legally speaking, no maritime or admiralty 
causes exist in the Territory.' It is true that no causes of this kind can be created by the 
operation of a congressional enactment; but it appears to us that a little reflection will 
shew that such causes do exist and must frequently arise upon our inland seas, although 
there may be no court authorized to take cognizance of them. The same contracts will be 
made, and the same relations exist between those concerned in the commerce and navi-
gation of the lakes as of the ocean. These fresh water seas are bordered by a foreign nation, 
and by different states of the Union, possessing jurisdictions independent of each other, 
and are actually 'navigable from the sea by vessels of ten or more tons burthen.' This lat• 
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chequer" instead of "admiralty" would have been a better term 
to use in designating the United States business of the territorial 
court. 
By a rule adopted November 5, 1819, the Supreme Court or-
dered that the clerk of the court "on the common law side" be 
register of the court "sitting in chancery;"02 and that the register 
keep the transactions of the court "sitting in chancery" in a 
separate book. 63 According to a rule adopted in 1821 every coun-
sellor and attorney "on the common law side" was "of course" 
a solicitor on the "chancery side."64 The transactions of the court 
"in chancery" were recorded in a separate journal from November 
5, 1819, through 1822.65 Not counting divorce and alimony, a 
total of 240 cases and matters "in chancery" appear in the records. 
The Supreme Court on its "common law side" started out as 
a court of unlimited common law jurisdiction, and ended up as 
a court of errors and appeals. The first step in this development 
was the establishment of district courts in 1805.66 These courts 
were authorized to try at designated places cases not involving 
title or capital punishment, the Supreme Court to have "exclu-
sive" jurisdiction of the excepted cases, and "appellate jurisdiction 
in all cases whatever."67 When county courts were established in 
1815°8 an attempt was made to give these courts "exclusive" 
jurisdiction of certain cases but power to deprive the Supreme 
Court of any of the common law jurisdiction conferred by Con-
gress was challenged, 69 and the "exclusive" provision eliminated.70 
The Supreme Court continued to have "exclusive" original juris-
diction of certain cases, and "appellate jurisdiction" in county 
tcr circumstance may be no othenvise material than to show the extent and variety of the 
maritime transactions which do and may exist in relation to the commerce of the lakes. 
It is easy to conceive that seamen, ship builders, freighters, part owners, and others, in-
cluding foreigners as well as citizens, may have rights and claims requiring the aid of a 
maritime and admiralty court. Among the numerous causes requiring the same aid, we will 
mention that of salvage, which it is easy to conceive may arise on the lakes as well as on 
the ocean .••• ·we respectfully submit to the consideration of the committee the propriety 
of reconsidering the subject, and if it should not be thought expedient to give us a District 
Court, at least to extend to the present judges maritime and admiralty jurisdiction, and 
leave them to decide what causes do and what do not come within that power." 
62 2 TRANSAcnONS (1814-1824) 191 (1938). 
63 Id. at 192. 
64 Id. at 525. 
65 Id. at 461-480. 
66 I LAws OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN (reprint) 17 (1871). 
61 Id. at IO. 
68 Id. at 184. 
60 Sec Blume, Circuit Courts and the Nisi Prius System: The Making of an Appellate 
Court, 38 MICH. L. REV. 311 (1940). 
70 2 LAws OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN (reprint) 132 (1874). 
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court cases. In 1823, after Michigan Territory had been expanded 
westward to the Mississippi, Congress provided for an "additional 
judge" to try cases in the area north and west of Lake Michigan.71 
Judgments of the "additional judge" in civil cases were review-
able by the Supreme Court on ·writ of error or equity appeal. 
For this area the Supreme Court became almost entirely an ap-
pellate court. Schemes under which judges of the Supreme Court 
were to try cases in the several counties east of Lake Michigan 
were adopted by the territorial legislature in 1824,72 1825,73 
1828,74 and 1833.715 The act of 1825 provided that the circuit 
courts should have the same original jurisdiction as the Supreme 
Court except cases concerning the United States, equity cases, and 
cases of divorce and alimony. But in 1827 it was provided that 
the circuit courts should have "concurrent" chancery jurisdiction 
subject to appeal. The following are totals of Supreme Court 
cases and matters that show up for the first time in the records 
for 1833-1836: 
United States cases ______________ _ 
Chancery cases-----------------
Petitions for divorce _____________ _ 







To the end of its existence the Supreme Court sat as a district 
and circuit court for the trial of United States cases, and as a 
court of chancery for the trial of territorial chancery cases, but 
after the establishment of circuit courts did not sit for the trial 
of territorial common law cases. It is not surprising that it was 
sometimes referred to as "the court of chancery," and that a sep-
arate court of chancery was established after Michigan became a 
state. 
Divorce and Alimony 
The court rules of 1819 that ordered the keeping of a separate 
equity docket provided that causes of divorce and alimony should 
be placed on the same docket.76 An act of the Legislative Council 
11 3 Stat. 722 (1823). 
72 2 LAws OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN (reprint) 217 (1874). 
73 Id. at 265. 
74 Id. at 692. 
75 3 id. at 1020. 
76 Note 53 supra. 
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approved April 12, 1827, provided that proceedings for divorce 
should be commenced by "bill."77 In the margin of the Code of 
1827 ("published by authority") the compilers digested this pro-
vision as authorizing an application "to chancery for a divorce." 
This act was repealed in 1832 by an act which provided for jury 
trial, and that proceedings for divorce should be commenced by 
"petition."78 After the passage of this act proceedings for divorce 
were entered in the general calendar, and were no longer classified 
as chancery cases. In the years 1828-1831 some seventeen divorces 
were granted by the Legislative Council.79 
In eighteenth century England divorces a mensa et thoro were 
granted by ecclesiastical courts; divorces a vinculo matrimonii 
only by act of Parliament. The absence of ecclesiastical courts in 
America led to considerable experimentation. "A Law respecting 
divorce" adopted in the Northwest Territory in 179580 specified 
the causes for divorce, and provided that the General Court and 
circuit courts should have sole cognizance of divorce cases. The 
validity of this attempt to confer ecclesiastical jurisdiction on the 
common law court established by Congress has been questioned,81 
but if judicial divorce was to be had instead of legislative divorce, 
where was the power to be vested? The Northwest law was 
adopted from Massachusetts, and there is nothing to indicate that 
the proceeding was considered chancery in nature. A contrary 
implication arises from use of the term "libel" to describe the 
complaint. 
Acts "concerning divorces" or "divorce" were adopted in Mich-
igan Territory in 1819,82 1827,83 183284 and 1833.85 All these 
statutes authorized the granting of both types of divorce (a mensa 
et thoro and a vinculo matrimonii) for specified causes; made pro-
vision for notice to the defendant; and prescribed the methods of 
trial. The act of 1819, adopted from New York, provided that 
if adultery should be denied, a feigned issue should be submitted 
to a jury, but if not denied the proof should be submitted to a 
"master in chancery" for opinion and report. Proof of "cruel and 
77 2 LAws OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN (reprint) 363 (1874). 
78 3 id. at 931. 
70 Id. at 1481. 
80 LAws OF TIIE NORTHWEST TERRITORY 1788-1800, 258 (Pease ed. 1925). 
81 l MARSHALL, A HISTORY OF THE COURTS AND LAWYERS OF Omo 218 (1934). 
82 l LAws OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN (reprint) 494 (1871). 
83 2 id. at 363 (1874). 
H 3 id. at 931. 
M Id. at 1005. 
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inhuman treatment" was to be "taken in the cause in the usual 
manner." Similar provisions will be found in the act of 1827. 
The acts of 1832 and 1833 authorized the court "to hear witnesses 
in open court on the stand, or to receive depositions taken with 
notice to the adverse party." Jury trial, if claimed by either 
party, was to be had of all facts except "impotency." 
The uncertainty that existed in Michigan Territory as to the 
place of divorce and alimony in the judicial system is reflected 
by the records. In the first two journal entries made in the first 
divorce case (1809)86 the case was referred to as "in chancery;" 
in the third journal entry the words "in chancery" were lined 
out; in the fourth (the decree) no reference to chancery was 
made. The complainant's pleading was designated "bill of com-
plaint." In the second case (1812)87 the complainant filed a "peti-
tion" which was referred to in the journal as "petition and bill 
of complaint" and as "bill of complaint." In a case commenced 
in 1815,88 and in one commenced in 1816,89 a "bill of complaint" 
was filed. But in October 1819 Sibley as "attorney & proctor" 
filed a "libel."90 According to the clerk this case was "in chancery," 
and a prayer to withdraw a plea was addressed to the judges 
"sitting as a court of chancery." Sibley was an experienced lawyer, 
and, later, a very able judge of the Supreme Court, and his choice 
of terms should not be attributed to either ignorance or careless-
ness. He may not have known that six days earlier the court had 
ordered that cases of divorce and alimony "be placed on the same 
docket with the cases depending on the equity side of the court,"81 
or he may have doubted the effect of the rule. After 1819 until 
the statute of 1832°2 divorce cases were "in chancery." The stat-
ute of 1832 provided that an application for divorce should 
state "the cause" on which the prayer of the "petition" was 
founded. Contrasted with "bills" for divorce employed in the 
period 1819-1832, "petitions" for divorce were relatively brief 
861 TRANSACTIONS (1805-1814) 186 (1935). 
81 Id. at 277. The papers in the file are printed in 2 id. at 381 (1938). 
881 id. (1814-1824) 70 (1938). 
89 Id. at 73. The bill of complaint is printed in id. at 551. 
90 Id. at 350. The "libel" was filed October 22, 1819. 
91 2 id. at 162. The rules were adopted October 16, 1819. Referring to the rules 
adopted in 1819, "Xenos" in the Detroit Gazette of August 11, 1820, wrote: "That the su• 
preme court, during a great part of a four months' session, held its sittings during the night, 
instead of the day time; and then without the knowledge of the people, at private offices, 
where not only the suitors, but even the officers of the court had no right to intrude •••• 
That at these night sessions, a multitude of rules of court were entered of record .•• ," 
92 Note 84 supra. 
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and simple. The following totals are from the Supreme Court's 
records and the statutes: 
I 805-1819 Bills; petition; libel 
1819-1832 Bills in chancery _________ _ 
1828-1831 Special legislative acts 





In a suit in chancery commenced in the Supreme Court in 
1836°3 the complainant prayed for maintenance and support; to 
restrain the defendant from interfering with her or her child; 
and for a ·writ of ne exeat. Writs of injunction and ne exeat were 
allowed, and a decree entered requiring the defendant to pay a 
certain sum to enable the complainant to defray the expenses of 
the suit, and a further sum each week for her maintenance and 
support. After Michigan became a state, the state court of 
chancery dismissed the bill, 94 the chancellor stating: 
"The bill in this case is filed not for a divorce, but for 
alimony merely. . . . The whole current of authorities goes 
to show that courts of chancery have never entertained juris-
diction in cases of this kind, except in aid of some other 
court, or to carry into effect a marriage contract, or in the 
execution of a trust. . . . In England, when the court of 
chancery succeeded to the jurisdiction of the spiritual courts 
during the usurpation, it entertained suits of this kind, but 
not since the restoration .... I am satisfied that, exclusive 
of any statutory provision upon the subject, this court has 
no jurisdiction to entertain proceedings of this kind. "95 
The procedure of granting legislative divorces can be traced 
in the journals of the Legislative Council. Public notice was re-
quired, 00 but consideration was in committee. The special acts 
did not state facts or even the grounds of divorce. Bills of chancery, 
on the other hand, contained detailed statements of fact, and 
03 1 TRANSACTIONS (1825-1836) 159 (1940). 
04 Harr. Ch. Rep. (Mich.) 19 (1836-42). 
05 The Chancellor, Elon Farnsworth, had been admitted to practice before the terri-
torial Supreme Court in 1825, and had appeared as attorney in that court in more than 
eighty cases. 
oo Notices of intention to apply to the Legislative Council for divorce will be found in 
the Detroit Gazette of April 8 and 22, 1830. Notice of intention to contest a petition for 
divorce before the Legislative Council appears in the Gazette of April 22. No search has 
been made for other similar notices. In 1831 the committee to which a petition had been 
referred reported that notice of the petition had not been given. JOURNAL OF LEGISLATIVE 
COUNCIL 129. The Detroit Gazette of March 4, 1830, contained a clipping from the Cin-
cinnati Gazette re legislative divorces in Ohio. For a discussion of the powers of territorial 
legislatures to grant divorces, see Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1887). 
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usually included special interrogatories calling for a full discovery 
of the facts of the case.97 
Injunctions. Ne exeat 
The act of Congress of March 3, 1823, that conferred on the 
judges of Michigan Territory "a chancery, as well as a common 
law jurisdiction," provided that the tenure of the judges should 
be limited to four years, the offices of the incumbent judges to 
become vacant February I, 1824.98 This change from the provi-
sion of the Ordinance of 1787 that the commissions of the judges 
should "continue in force during good behaviour" was significant 
in showing that Congress did not consider the Ordinance "un-
alterable, unless by common consent," nor did it consider the 
territorial judges United States judges who, under Article III 
of the Constitution, were to "hold their offices during good be-
haviour." Whatever may have been the broad purposes of Congress 
in making this change, it seems clear that in Michigan Territory 
the change was promoted by a Detroit group interested in having 
judges Woodward and Griffin removed from office. Woodford, 
in his Life of Justice Woodward,00 calls attention to a letter ·writ-
ten by James D. Doty to Henry R. Schoolcraft October 25, 1822: 
"The good work has commenced here. Woodward & 
Griffin are likely to have something happen to them. If you 
take the Detroit Gazette you will perceive their conduct for 
years past is presented to them for their inspection - A peti-
tion will probably be presented to Congress for a repeal of 
the Ordinance under which they hold their offices. This is 
a modest way of turning a man out of office."100 
In 1829 John P. Sheldon, editor of the Gazette, boasted that he 
had "scourged" one set of judges out of office, and most of them 
out of the Territory, stating that he considered it the business 
of his newspaper to call "the people's servants to account."101 
97 The full text of a "bill of complaint" for divorce "in chancery" filed in 1825 will be 
found in 1 TRANSACTIONS (1825-1836) 449 (1940). 
08 3 Stat. 769. 
09 P. 174 (1953). 
100 This letter appears also in 11 TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES 270 (Car-
ter ed. 1943). In 1832 Doty wrote the Secretary of State that he had "taken the advice of 
legal gentlemen" who concurred in his opinion that his commission as "additional judge" 
which was to be in effect during "good behaviour" was not affected by acts of Congress 
subsequently passed. 13 id. at 521. In a footnote to this letter Carter calls attention to a 
resolution proposed in the Senate, March 2, 1832, calling upon the President for an ex-
planation of the displacement of the territorial judges for Michigan, Florida, and Arkansas. 
1011 TRANSACTIONS (1825-1836) 357 and 366 (1940). 
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Sheldon's statements of 1829 were in defense of a charge of 
contempt made against him in the Supreme Court for publishing 
an editorial which began:102 
PROGRESS OF "THE PERFECTION OF REASON" IN MICHIGAN 
The Supreme Court of this Territory terminated its De-
cember session last week. As usual, there was but little busi-
ness done, and a portion of that little, we are led to believe, 
was but poorly done. 
The editor then called attention to the case of United States v. 
Reed in which the Supreme Court had held that a new trial 
should be granted because of the erroneous denial of a challenge 
of a juror for cause, even though the defendant used one of his 
two peremptory challenges to remove the disqualified juror, and 
did not use his remaining peremptory challenge. The editor 
ridiculed a statement made by Judge Woodbridge in his opinion 
that deprivation of a "fixed & positive right" was reason enough 
for a new trial, observing: 
"To men of plain common sense, we think the above 
decision of the learned majority of the Supreme Court will 
be thought a curious thing; they will wonder at the little 
knowledge which the people in general possess of the science 
of law - they will wonder, too, that law should differ so widely 
from common sense and justice. We think, too, that many a 
poor plodding attorney, in the States, when he shall read the 
above decision of the Supreme Court of Michigan, will kick 
his Blackstone out of his office and acknowledge himself a 
nincom." 
While it seems unlikely that much public interest could have 
been excited by the technical question of harmless error involved 
in United States v. Reed, the attack on the court was, as Judge 
Woodbridge feared, "calculated to elicit all the slumbering ran-
cour of former times."103 Judges Woodbridge and Chipman be-
102 Id. at 338. 
103 Td. at 370. In a letter dated January 27, 1829, addressed to Austin E. Wing, Delegate 
to Congress, ·woodbridge wrote: "An occurrence has taken place which, for aught I 
know - or can anticipate - may leave no alternative but to quit - ·we have on hand a case 
of contempt - It is a matter which in its march is calculated to elicit all the slumbering 
rancour of former times - The question is likely to come fully up - Shall the law bend to 
John P. Sheldon?-or Shall John P. Sheldon bend to the law?-Should the decision of 
the law be against John P. Sheldon - will Thomas Sheldon [sheriff] execute the law? •.• 
One thing only I am free now to say concerning it - that when the Supreme Court shall be 
found too feeble or too timid to protect itself from scandalous contempts - it will be too 
contemptible for me - to remain a member of ••• • "Ibid. 
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came again the targets of the "anti-court party," and were not 
re-appointed in 1832. When their failure to be re-appointed was 
attributed to political differences ·with the administration at Wash-
ington, a spokesman for the "anti-court party" in a communi-
cation signed "Consistency" asked these questions:104 
"Did his late honor [Judge Woodbridge] intend to in-
clude among his 'judicial acts' his despotic assumption of 
power and gross perversion of official authority in the mem-
orable canvassing of 1825? Did he suppose the public had for-
gotten his tyrannical punishment of Mr. Sheldon in 1829? 
Is it necessary to refer to the case of the United States against 
John Reed or that of Cole and Porter against John Hendree, 
or the injunction which he made dog-cheap in Michigan 
••• ?"105 
The charge implied in the last question that a New-Englander 
who had attended the law school at Litchfield, Connecticut, and 
whose father had gone to Marietta with the Ohio Company,10a 
had made injunctions "dog-cheap in Michigan" is sufficiently in-
congruous to be intriguing. It will be examined even though, 
because of its source, it is not sufficiently trustworthy to be relied 
on to any extent. 
Of the 240 chancery cases commenced in the territorial Supreme 
Court, 111 involved prayers for in junctions either as the principal 
or sole relief (column A), or in connection with other relief 
(column B): 
I. To stay proceedings at law: A._B 
Allowed: Bates (1805-1807) 1 
Woodward (1805-1824) _______ 4 
Witherell (1808-1828) I 
Sibley (1824-1836) 7---2 
Hunt (1824-1827) ---------.J 
Chipman (1827-1832) 9-2 
Woodbridge (1828-1832) l_l 
Morell (1832-1836) _l 
Court (1805-1836) -2 _________________ 1 __ 1 
Denied: Witherell (1808-1828) I 
Sibley (1824-1836) I 
Chipman (1827-1832) I 
104 DEMOCRATIC FREE PRESS AND MICHIGAN INTELLIGENCER, March 15, 1832. 
105 Reprinted in part in 28 MICHIGAN PIONEER AND HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS 166, where 
"Consistency" is identified as Ebenezer Reed who was associated with Sheldon in editing 
the Detroit Gazette when it was destroyed by fire in 1830. 
106 2 FARMER, HISTORY OF DETROIT AND MICHIGAN 1076 (2d ed. 1889) Also see Stocking, 
New England Men in Michigan History, 5 MICHIGAN HISTORY MAGAZINE, 123, 132 (1921). 
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2. To stay waste: A.__B 
Allowed: Woodward (1805-1824) 1 
Sibley (1824-1836) 
Woodbridge (1828-1832) 1 
Morell (1832-1836) 
Court (1805-1836) 1 
4 
3. To restrain trespass: 
Allowed: Woodward (1805-1824) 1 
Witherell (1808-1828) 
Sibley (1824-1836) 1 
Chipman (1827-1832) 1 
Woodbridge (1828-1832) 1 
Morell (1832-1836) 1 
Court (1805-1836) 1 
Denied: Wilkins (1832-1836) 1 
4. To restrain interference with person: 
Allowed: Woodbridge (1828-1832) 1 
Morell (1832-1836) 1 
5. To restrain nuisance: 
Allowed: Morell (1832-1836) I 
6. To restrain diversion of water: 
Allowed: Morell (1832-1836) I 
7. To restrain collection of taxes: 
Allowed: Chipman (1827-1832) I 
8. To restrain patent infringement: 
Allowed: Sibley (1824-1836) I 
9. To restrain transfer of property: 
Allowed: Woodward & Griffin 
Sibley (1824-1836) 1_2 
Chipman (1827-1832) I 
Woodbridge (1828-1832) 
Morell (1832-1836) 1_7 
Court (1805-1836) 1 
1_1 
Denied: Wilkins (1832-1836) 
IO. To restrain purchase of property: 
Allowed: Chipman (1827-1832) 1 
11. To restrain incumbrance of property: 
Allowed: Sibley (1824-1836) 1 
Morell (1832-1836) 
1_1 
12. To restrain claim to property: 
Allowed: Court (1805-1836) 
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13. To restrain payment of money: .A__B 
Allowed: Sibley (1824-1836) 
Woodbridge (1828-1832) 1 
Morell (1832-1836) 
Court (1805-1836) 1_1 
Denied: Wilkins (1832-1836) 1 
Court (1805-1836) 1 
14. To restrain receipt of money: 
Allowed: Sibley (1824-1836) 1 
Chipman (1827-1832) 1 
Morell (1832-1836) 1 
Court (1805-1836) 1 
15. To restrain departure (ne exeat): 
Allowed: Woodward & Griffin 1 
Witherell (1808-1828) I 
Morell (1832-1836) 1 
1 
16. To restrai 
Allowed: Woodbridge (1828-1832) 1 
Court (1805-1836) 1 
1 
All injunctions allowed by a single judge were temporary in 
the sense that action was restrained only until the matter could 
be heard by the full court. The allocatur, usually ·written at the 
foot of the bill of complaint, fixed the bond required, and directed 
the issuance of a writ of injunction. Writs of injunction were 
issued by the clerk of the court under its seal, and tested in the 
name of the presiding judge. That one judge had no power to 
grant an injunction "in term time" was argued in 1830:107 
"Motion to set aside Injunction granted during the last 
term by his honor Judge Woodbridge - A single Judge has 
no power to grant an Injunction in term time either by any 
act of Congress - or of the Legislative Council. I. The Acts 
of Congress require two Judges at least to the exercise of 
Judicial authority. 2. The act of Council authorises a single 
Judge to grant an injunction only in vacation-" 
The motion to dissolve was overruled. In 1825 Woodbridge as 
counsel for complainant argued in a letter to Judge Witherell 
that a single judge should allow an injunction to stay proceedings 
107 Case 1316, 1 TRANSACTIONS (1825-1836) 108 (1940). 
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at law whenever any doubt exists as to the justice of those pro-
ceedings, adding:108 
"Like the allowance of a ·writ of error no rights are com-
mitted by it, nor does the allowance imply any the least com-
mitment of opinion in the Judge making that allowance." 
While it appears from the above table that at least six prayers 
for injunction were denied by one of the judges, the impression 
given by the records is that in the mine run of cases the injunc-
tion prayed for was allowed merely upon a reading of the bill. 
Although it is impossible to show with any degree of com-
pleteness how the various prayers for injunction were finally dis-
posed of by the Supreme Court, it does appear that two of the 
six prayers denied by a single judge were also denied by the 
court; that 12 of the temporary injunctions were made perpetual, 
and 27 dissolved. In a brief submitted to Judge Woodbridge in 
1828 in support of a motion to dissolve an injunction on the 
ground that the answer had denied "all the equity set up in the 
bill" the following appears:100 
"This Injn was obtained in 1824 to restrain the def. 
from collecting the amount of a Judgment obtained before a 
Justice of the peace-The defts answer denies all equity set 
up in the Bill and the Inl should be dissolved of course . 
. . . Blake 404.5 1 Johns C.R. 211.444. 2 Do. 205. Hamd 
495. Eden 86." 
In one of the cases cited,11° Chancellor Kent pointed out that 
"plaintiff is not permitted to traverse and contradict the answer 
by affidavits; but the injunction is dissolved, of course, if the 
answer denies all the equity in the bill." Relying on another of 
Kent's opinions,111 Blake, in his Historical Treatise on the Prac-
tice of the Court of Chancery of the State of New-York (1818), 
stated:112 "An injunction, will in general, be dissolved when an 
answer comes in, and denies all the equity of the bill." According 
to Eden (Baron Henley) "if the answer contains a sufficient de-
fence to the case stated in the bill, the injunction will be dis-
solved."113 Relying on these or other similar authorities the Su-
108 Id. at 247. 
100 Id. at 54, Case 1130. 
110 Hoffman v. Livingston, I Johns. Ch. R. (N.Y.) 211 (1814). 
111 Boyd v. Anderson, 2 Johns. Ch. R. (N.Y.) 202, 205 (1816). 
112 At p. 405. 
113 A TREATISE ON nu; !.AW OF INJUNCTIONS BY TIIE HON. ROBERT HENLEY EDEN 86 
(1st Am. ed. 1822). 
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preme Court dissolved the injunction previously allowed in the 
above case, and, in other cases, stated in the record that the reason 
for ordering the injunction dissolved was the fact that an answer 
had come in denying all equity in the bill. The practice thus 
established was followed by the first chancellor of the state.114 
Any answer to a bill for injunction involved discovery to 
some degree. When the injunction sought was to stay proceedings 
at law, both injunction and discovery were often necessary- "use-
less one without the other." In a case commenced in 1835115 
Woodbridge as attorney for complainant argued that a motion to 
dissolve on the ground that the answer had denied all equity in 
the bill should not be "enforced" until exceptions to the answer 
had been disposed of, citing 4 Paige 111. The bill in this case 
had alleged that the complainant, John Allen of Ann Arbour, had 
been sued by John Harford in the Washtenaw Circuit Court in 
an action of covenant; that Allen had pleaded that the agreement 
sued on had been obtained by fraud; that the action was pending, 
and ready for trial. In addition to a detailed statement of the 
events which led up to the signing of the agreement sued on in the 
Circuit Court, the bill contained an extensive charge of con-
federation followed by an allegation that relief was available only 
in chancery where discovery and full disclosure under oath could 
be coerced. After demanding that the defendant answer the 
premises "as fully as if the same were herein again interrogated," 
the complainant set out some 35 special interrogatories with a 
prayer that the defendant be required to answer them distinctly 
"according to the best of his remembrance, information and be-
lief.''116 Although defendant's answer, some 17 pages in length, 
114 Connor v. John Allen, Harr. Ch. Rep. (Mich.) 371 (1836-42) (Farnsworth, 
Chancellor). 
115 1 TRANSACTIONS (1825-1836) 155, Case 1460 (1940). 
116 This part of the bill demands that the defendant answer "whether in the month 
of August or fore part of the month of September A.D. one thousand eight hundred and 
twenty four, he did not visit Ann Arbour in the County of Washtenaw, Michigan Terri-
tory and put up at the House of E. W. Rumsey late of said village, now deceased, and 
whether at the time of his arrival he did not state to your Orator and others that he 
was from Rochester in the State of New York and whether at that time your Orator and 
him said Harford were not entire strangers to each other, and whether he did not offer 
and profess to want to buy an interest in said Village of Ann Arbour from your Orator, 
and that he state fully and without evasions or equivocation, whether during the time he 
was negociating for a part of your Orators interest in said village, he did not represent 
himself to your Orator or to others in your Orators presence, to be a man of property 
and influence, and whether he did not state to your Orator or to others in your Orators 
presence, that he was the owner of a large property in Rochester, and whether at the 
same time and before the agreement referred to was concluded he did not state to your 
Orator or to others in the hearing of your Orator, that he was interested in the large 
Flouring Mills of said Rochester and was aquainted with the building of Mills, and 
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contained detailed answers to all the charges and interrogatories 
set out in the bill, complainant's solicitor was not satisfied, and 
filed exceptions. Whether the injunction should be dissolved be-
fore the exceptions were disposed of involved a problem of choice 
between New York and English chancery practice which was un-
resolved as the period of the Territory came to a close. 
Another suit involving discovery and injunction pending when 
the territorial period came to a close may be of interest.117 Com-
plainants, against whom judgments had been recovered in a jus-
tice's court, alleged that they had been prevented from making a 
defense in the justice's court by repeated discontinuances until 
the death of their only witness. It was argued in the state Court 
of Chancery, to which the case was transferred, that as complain-
ants could have sought discovery while the cases below were still 
pending, they were not entitled to an injunction. Chancellor 
Farnsworth, reflecting no doubt his long experience as a solicitor 
in the territorial Supreme Court, overruled the objection, saying: 
"A court of chancery was formerly the only tribunal which 
could afford adequate relief. But recently courts of law have 
also given effect to defenses of this kind. The court of chan-
cery, having originally exclusive jurisdiction, still retains it . 
. . . The only doubt in the case is, were the parties bound to 
apply to this court before judgment rendered in the court 
below. It has been urged that the defendants below could 
have taken appeals to the circuit court, and could have 
then applied to this court for a discovery, and would have 
been entitled to their remedy. I have entertained much 
doubt whether this case comes within the exceptions to the 
general rule as stated in 10 Johns., 590, and 3 Pet., 214. Was 
it necessary? was it incumbent upon the parties to adopt this 
more expensive and circuitous proceeding to make their de-
fense, after having, on two several occasions, appeared, in 
both suits, made their defense, and produced their witness? 
I am inclined to think not." 
whether he did not state, as aforesaid, that if he could purchase at Ann Arbour to suit 
him he would bring them on to that place and that he would build a large store house 
and immediately erect Flouring Mills, and whether he did not hold himself out to the 
then citizens of Ann Arbour as able to build up said Village and having influence with 
wealthy and respectable citizens of Rochester who could be influenced by him said 
Harford to remove to that place, and whether he did not generally insinuate either 
directly or indirectly to the citizens that he was a man of wealth. - And that he state 
whether on the eighteenth day of September A.D. 1824 he did not make a contract with 
your Orator for the premises described in the article of agreement herein before set forth, 
and whether •• .'' and so on and on. 
1171 TRANSACTIONS (1825-1836) 158, Case 1478 (1940); Harr. Ch. Rep. (Mich.) 366. 
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The earliest territorial statute dealing with ne exeat (1805) 
provided that the Supreme Court in session or any two judges 
thereof in vacation might grant writs of ne exeat to prevent the 
departure of any person "out of the country." This law,118 said 
to have been adopted from Virginia, further provided: 
". . . but such ·writ shall not be granted, but on bill filed 
and affidavits made to the truth of its allegations, and then 
such writs may be granted, or refused, as shall seem just; 
and if granted, it shall be endorsed thereon in what penalty, 
bond and security shall be required; and when the court or 
judges shall be satisfied that there is no reason for the re-
straint, or sufficient security shall be given to perform what 
may be decreed, the writ may be discharged." 
"An Act directing the mode of proceeding in chancery" adopted 
in 1820119 authorized one judge in vacation to issue ·writs of ne 
exeat to prevent departure "out of the territory" subject to 
limitations similar to those set out in the law of 1805. These 
provisions were re-enacted by the Legislative Council in 1827120 
and in 1833.121 
One of the last cases considered by the territorial Supreme 
Court before it went out of business at the end of June 1836 was 
the suit for alimony discussed above122 - a suit which involved 
not only the payment of money for complainant's maintenance 
and support, but writs of injunction and ne exeat. The allocatur 
indorsed on the bill of complaint reads: 
"On reading and considering the foregoing bill I allow 
the Writ of Ne Exeat within prayed for, and the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court is directed to issue the same, to be directed 
to the Sheriff of the County of St. Clair, directing security 
to be taken under it in the sum of five thousand dollars 
conditioned according to law. I also allow the writ of In-
junction as within prayed for. GEO: MORELL" 
The writ of ne exeat, after reciting the nature of the complaint, 
commanded the sheriff to require the defendant to give security 
in the sum of $5000 that he would not attempt "to go to parts 
beyond the Seas nor out of the jurisdiction of this Court" with-
11s Pp. 55-56 supra. 
1191 LAWS OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN (reprint) 697 at 709 (1871). 
120 2 id. at 525 (187 4). 
121 3 id. at 1188. 
122 Note 93 supra. 
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out its consent, and should he refuse to give such security to 
commit him to prison until he should "do it of his ovm accord." 
The sheriff's return shows that the defendant was arrested June 
6, 1836, and gave bond as required. According to a journal entry 
inserted after the transactions of June 20 had been ,;\Tritten up, 
the defendant "by Woodbridge and Backus his solicitors" moved 
"for reasons now filed" that the i;\Trits of ne exeat and injunction 
be dissolved. Woodbridge later insisted that neither he nor 
Backus appeared as solicitor for the defendant, but that he, Wood-
bridge, appeared as amicus curia because of what he "deemed a 
most unwarrantable usurpation of the Court - & a most oppressive 
deprivation of the rights of an American citizen." In his brief 
Woodbridge stated: 
"That as Writs of Ne Exeat affect so vitally the personal 
liberty of the citizen - they are never granted, except reluc-
tantly. 3 John Cha. 412-415 - & the Books generally. That 
they never are - except in aid of some other Tribunal -
or where some definite & certain sum - has been decreed -
or sworn to: - nor then - unless the claim grow out of the 
prosecution of some other principal matter ( e.g. application 
for a Divorce) - depending before itself- or some other 
court - or unless there be imminent danger of its loss. - See 
Har Cha. 161.-1 Vez' 49-94. 2 Atk. 210." 
June 29, after hearing arguments of counsel on behalf of both 
parties, the court ordered the payment of $40 to enable com-
plainant to prosecute her suit and $4 per week for her support, 
and by saying nothing with respect to the i;\Trits of ne exeat and 
injunction, left them in force to be dealt with by the court of 
the chancery of the state. By a letter dated August 6, 1836, the 
defendant reported to Woodbridge that he had had another inter-
view with Mr. Farnsworth, but had "come off rather unfavorably 
impressed as to his efficiency in taking hold of matters pertaining 
to his duties, as Chancellor." Although beyond the period of the 
present study, it may be of interest to note that Woodbridge 
drafted a petition to the state legislature in behalf of the defendant, 
and a projet of a statute regulating the use of ne exeat.123 
123 The papers referred to (originals or photostats) are in the file of Case 1482, 
Territorial Supreme Court, Law Library, University of Michigan. For final disposition 
of the case, see Peltier v. Peltier, Harr. Ch. Rep. (Mich.) 19 (1836-42) (Farnsworth, Chan-
cellor). In connection with an earlier case 'Woodbridge had been requested to "look over" 
defendant's answer as "Mr. Farnsworth acknowledges himself to be very young in chancery 
cases." I TRANSAcrIONS (1825-1836) 384. As shown by id., p. 31, Farnsworth was 
admitted to practice before the territorial Supreme Court in 1825. Originally from 
74 MICHIGAN LAw REVIEW [ Vol. 59 
How Judge Woodbridge made the injunction "dog-cheap in 
Michigan" does not appear.124 
Foreclosure of Mortgages 
"An Act concerning mortgages" passed by the Legislative 
Council in 1827125 provided in detail for the registration of 
mortgages, and for foreclosure by advertisement and sale without 
court decree. That many mortgages were foreclosed in this man-
ner is shown by the files of the current newspapers. In one issue 
of the Detroit Journal and Michigan Advertiser (October 23, 
1833) advertisements of sales under six different mortgages will 
be found. Our interest, however, is not in foreclosure without 
court action, but in the records of more than 70 cases in the 
territorial Supreme Court in which foreclosure or foreclosure and 
sale was the principal or only relief sought. 
Before outlining the practice followed by the court in a typical 
foreclosure case attention should be called to some provisions of 
"An Act to prescribe the mode of proceeding in Chancery" passed 
in 1833:126 
"Sec. 34. Whenever a bill shall be filed for a foreclosure 
or satisfaction of a mortgage, the court shall have power to 
decree a sale of the mortgaged premises or such part thereof 
as may be sufficient to satisfy the mortgage. 
Vermont (born 1799), he was a graduate of Middlebury College, and had commenced 
the study of law before coming to Detroit in 1822. He continued the study of law in the 
office of Sibley &: Whitney. According to Woodbridge, "few in any country have passed a 
better examination than he did." Ibid. He was appointed chancellor of the new state of 
Michigan July 18, 1836. According to James V. Campbell's unpublished Judicial History of 
Michigan (1886) (copy in Law Library, University of Michigan), "Elon Farnsworth was ad-
mirably fitted for his office. He was a thorough scholar as well as lawyer, with cool judg• 
ment and an intuitive knowledge of men, and an enlightened sense of justice. Under his 
careful administration the equity system became well adapted to the necessities of the 
Community, and divested of unreasonable conditions and vexatious delay. Very few of 
his decrees were reversed, and still less ought to have been. He belonged to the same 
class of wise and sensible jurists as Chancellor Kent whom in character and attainments 
he closely resembled." 
124 Judge Chipman, the other target of the anti-court party (supra note 104), allowed 
almost twice as many injunctions as Judge Woodbridge. Chipman, born in Vermont in 
1784, had this to say about himself in 1827: "I was admitted to the bar in Vermont in 
1806. Soon after I removed, or rather wandered, to South Carolina where I resided seven• 
teen years in the practise of my profession. My acquisitions in that state consisted of an 
amiable wife, a moderate competence, and some reputation as a lawyer, &: the friendship 
&: respect of some of the most estimable &: distinguished men at the south. Three years 
since I removed to this territory. . . . I have continued the practise of law here •••• " 
11 TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES 1112 (Carter ed. 1943). 
125 2 LAws OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN (reprint) 431 (1874). 
126 3 id. at 1179. 
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"Sec. 35. All sales of mortgaged premises under a decree 
of a court of chancery shall be made by the sheriff of the 
county in which the premises are situate, or a master in 
chancery, unless othenvise directed in the decree of sale. 
"Sec. 36. Deeds shall thereupon be executed by the sheriff, 
master, or person conducting such sale, which shall vest in 
the purchaser the same estate that would have vested in the 
mortgagee by a foreclosure of the equity of redemption; ... 
"Sec. 37. The proceeds of sale, after deducting the amount 
adjudged due on the mortgage and the costs awarded, shall 
be brought into court for the use of the person who may be 
entitled thereto, subject to the order of the court. And if 
the proceeds shall not be sufficient to satisfy the debt and costs, 
then the officer or person conducting the sale shall state the 
balance so remaining, in his return to the court of the pro-
ceedings on such sale; and thereupon execution may issue 
against the goods and chattels, lands and tenements of the 
mortgagor in whose hands soever they may be." 
Sections 38 and 39 of the statute prescribed procedures to be 
followed·when only interest or a portion of the principal sum is 
due. 
Why it was thought necessary to confer power to decree sale 
as well as foreclosure does not appear. It does appear, however, 
that the Supreme Court had decreed sale in many cases, and some 
doubt may have existed as to its power to do so, ·oide brief by 
Woodbridge in 1835:127 
"The law & current of Eng. decisions does not give even to 
Courts of Chancery the power to sell-in ordinary circum-
stances-but only the power to foreclose."128 
The Legislative Council had provided that where not regulated 
by statute chancery proceedings were to conform "to the rules 
and proceedings established by courts of chancery in England."129 
1271 TRANSACflONS (1825-18!16) 143 (1940). 
128 MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECl'IVE 453 
(1952), states: "By the normal practice of the English chancery, the suit to foreclose a 
mortgage envisaged a decree providing for the ascertainment of the amount of the 
mortgage debt, allowing the mortgagor a stated time, commonly six months, to pay it, 
and ordering that in default of payment of the indebtedness and costs, he stand fore-
closed of all right of redemption, the mortgagee in that event becoming the absolute 
owner of the land, legal title to which had been vested in him by the mortgage. Only in 
exceptional instances did the court exercise the power of ordering a sale. This course 
of practice was not departed from in England until the Chancery Practice Amendment 
Act of 1852." 
120 An Act directing the mode of proceeding in Chancery" passed in 1827 and an 
act with the same title passed in 1833, 2 LAws OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN (reprint) 517 
(1874); 3 id. at 1179. 
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The conferring by statute of the power of sale settled any doubts, 
and may have had the effect of validating past sales. A similar 
effect may have resulted from the act of Congress of 1823 which 
conferred on the Court "a chancery, as well as a common law 
jurisdiction" after it had exercised equity powers some eighteen 
years. 
The Ordinance of 1787, applicable to Michigan Territory, 
had declared that the inhabitants should always be entitled to 
"trial by jury," and .. judicial proceedings according to the course 
of the common law." The Constitution of the United States, also 
applicable to Michigan Territory, had preserved "trial by jury" 
in suits at common law involving more than $20. Where after 
a judicial sale of mortgaged property it was found that money was 
still due on the debt secured by the mortgage, was the mortgagee 
entitled to a decree for the deficiency? Or must he bring an action 
for the deficiency in a court of common law where trial by jury 
might be had? Under the then English chancery practice only 
the second alternative was available.130 The Michigan statute of 
1833 did not authorize a deficiency decree, but did provide that 
execution might issue upon the "return" of the officer making 
the sale. Whether the Legislative Council had power to make 
this provision may be questioned. It seems significant that in 
no case where a deficiency was reported did the Supreme Court 
enter a deficiency decree. 
The procedural course of a typical suit to foreclose a mortgage 
will be indicated by noting the steps taken in Rucker v. Macomb 
-a suit in chancery commenced in the territorial Supreme Court 
in 1816.131 One reason for selecting this case is the fact that the 
pleadings as well as the court's orders and decrees are set out at 
length in the court's journals, hence are readily available in 
print.132 Another reason is that it was the first foreclosure case 
prosecuted to a conclusion in the court. The case is also of in-
terest because of the amount of money secured ($9,700) and the 
130 MILLAR, supra note 128, at 455 states: "In the case of mortgage forecl<>!ure, if a 
deficiency is left after application of the proceeds to the amount due the mortgagee, and 
the mortgagor is personally liable on the promissory note or other obligation secured by 
the mortgage, the earlier rule, following that of the English chancery, relegated the 
mortgagee to his action at law for the recovery of such deficiency. But now statutes 
generally authorize the court in the foreclosure proceeding to render judgment for the 
amount of the deficiency." 
1311 TRANSACTIONS (1814-1824) 72 (1938). 
132 Since publication of the journal cited in note 131, the court's file has been found, 
and is available (in the Law Library of the University of Michigan) for study along with 
the journal entries and printed papers. 
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extent of the land covered by the mortgage (an undivided one-
third of "Hog Island," later known as "Belle Isle;" of "Grosse 
Isle;" of a farm "next below the town of Detroit;" and of a farm 
"fronting on the Grand Marais"). The mortgage, also set out in 
the record, was executed in New York City in 1809 and acknowl-
edged before Brockholst Livingston, a justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States. 
The above suit was commenced by filing a bill of complaint 
which alleged execution of the mortgage; death of the mortgagor 
leaving a widow and four minor children; and assignment of 
the mortgage to the complainant. It contained, also, a charge of 
confederation, typical of the old chancery bills, and some 38 
interrogatories to be answered by the defendants on oath. The 
relief prayed was sale of the mortgaged property as provided in 
the mortgage; the appointment of some master commissioner to 
effect the sale; further relief agreeable to equity and good con-
science; writs of subpoena to residents of the Territory, and 
other process or notice to defendants residing outside. Upon 
the filing of the bill the court ordered subpoenas served on the 
widow and minor children, and that notice be given to such 
defendants as might be absent from the Territory by inserting 
a notice in the Spectator or other New York City newspaper three 
successive weeks. Some three weeks later Charles Larned entered 
his appearance as counsel for the defendants. This was followed 
by a petition by the widow that she be appointed guardian ad 
!item for her minor children, and it was so ordered by the court. 
A year later, the cause coming on to be heard, the complainant, 
having obtained leave to amend his bill, filed a supplement which 
set out in great detail proceedings before the Register of Probate 
resulting in a partition of the tracts of land covered by the mort-
gage-one part going to Governor Cass. The court then recorded 
the appearance of the defendants and the filing of their several 
answers, and adjourned the case until the following year. The 
answer of the original mortgagee (who assigned to complainant) 
was sworn to in New York City before Justice Livingston; the 
answer of the minors by their guardian, and of the widow, before 
a justice of the peace in Detroit. At the term to which the case 
was adjourned (1818) "the said matters in said amended bill 
being by said answers sufficiently shewn and admitted," and the 
partition "sufficiently appearing of record," the court decreed 
that the mortgaged premises as partitioned be sold at public 
auction on the first Monday of tl1e following May; that notice of 
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the sale be published in the Detroit Gazette three successive weeks; 
and that George McDougall be appointed commissioner to con-
duct the sale. After finding that principal and interest due 
amounted to $11,658.72, the court decreed that complainant re-
cover this sum, and that the avails of the sale be first appropriated 
for this purpose, any excess to be paid into court. The court 
further decreed that McDougall execute deeds to the purchasers 
at the sale, and report his proceedings to the court. A year later 
the court noted in its journal that the master commissioner had 
filed his report of the sale of the mortgaged property, and his 
account for selling the same, which, a week later, was allowed 
by the court. These entries were followed by a decree reciting 
that by the report of the master the property had been sold for 
$6,314.48½ at which time the principal and interest due amounted 
to $12,812.62, and that costs totaled $205.21½. The decree 
further recited that complainant had paid the costs, and was 
willing to receive the amount obtained from the sale in full satis-
faction of the debt due him on the bond and mortgage. And the 
said "Bills, Answers, Exhibits and proceedings having been read, 
heard and fully understood, and the arguments of the Counsellors 
and solicitors of the parties having been heard thereon," it was 
decreed that the sales made by the master be confirmed, and that 
he deliver to the purchasers good and sufficient deeds; that "all 
equity of redemption" and "all claim of Dower" in the widow, 
and "all equity of redemption" in the minor children, "be forever 
foreclosed, taken away, and barred." 
In a foreclosure case commenced in 1822, concluded in 1831, 
the widow of the mortgagor claimed a half interest in the land 
under the Custom of Paris. The court decreed that sale be made 
"(subject to the right of Dower of the said Agatha Visger widow 
of the said Jacob Visger deceased according to the Coutume de 
Paris). "133 
In a foreclosure case commenced in 1824134 the complainant 
prayed (a) that defendant be required to answer the bill of com-
plaint; (b) that the matter be referred to a master for an account 
of the sums due; (c) that defendant be decreed to pay the amount 
found due; (d) that, in default of payment, all equity of redemp-
tion be foreclosed; (e) that the property be decreed sold, and all 
133 See photostats in file of Case 898, 1 TRANSACTIONS (1814-1824) 233 (1938). For a 
discussion of the Custom of Paris, see Blume, Probate and Administration on the Ameri-
can Frontier, 58 MICH. L. REv. 209, 210 (1959). 
134 Case 1104, 1 TRANSACTIONS (1814-1824) 327 (1938). 
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arrears paid out of the money received; (f) that any money re-
maining stand subject to the further orders of the court; (g) that 
persons renting the mortgaged property be enjoined from paying 
rent to defendant; (h) that a receiver be appointed to receive 
rents, issues and profits from the mortgaged premises; (i) that 
further relief be given agreeable to equity; and (j) that subpoena 
issue under a certain penalty. The prayers of the bill except (g) 
and (h) are similar to those found in the run-of-the-mill fore-
closure cases commenced in the court. The prayers for injunction 
and receiver were unusual, and were not included in later cases 
most likely because of the decision of the court in this case. Notes 
in the handwriting of Judge Sibley in part read: 
"The Bill charges-the nonpat of the annuity and prays 
&c. No suggestion that the Property is inadequate to secure 
the Debt-M0 to appoint a receiver of the rents and Profits &c 
reasons Court has the power-Blac. Com. I. 61.-91-Fon-
blanc. 5-Fonblanc 9 10 note-Powers of the Court to appt a 
receiver 2 Harrison 107.-Blake 451-2 Madox 232 is a dis-
cretionary power Authorities referred to by Mr Hammons 
digest-title receiver-at Mr Fletchers-Equity digest-604. 
654 ... If the annuity had been made dependent on the rents 
and profits of the mortgaged premises, then there would have 
been a forceable claim on the Court to protect the rights of 
the Pltff and would in such a Case, sustain such a motion and 
on affidavit, appoint a receiver-But in the present Case, I 
can discover, no fraud charged by the Bill-nor any other 
cause sufficient to deviate from what appears settled Law-
Eden on injunctions 218. 2 Madox 232 & 233." 
Complainant's motion for a receiver was overruled. 
A law adopted by the governor and judges of Michigan in 
1818136 authorized the governor of the Territory to appoint for 
each court having chancery jurisdiction 
". . . a master commissioner in chancery, whose duty it 
shall be, under the order and direction of the court, to take 
down testimony in writing, either in or out of court, and 
do all such other matters and things as are usually done and 
performed by masters commissioners in chancery, according 
to the usages and customs of chancery courts." 
The commission to be charged by a master on a sale of mortgaged 
property was fixed by court rule in 1821.136 The form of bond 
135 2 LAws OF TUE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN (reprint) 133 (1874). 
130 2 TRANSACrIONS (1814-1824) 526 (1938). 
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to be given by a master was prescribed in 1824 by a statute which 
also provided for a special appointment by the court if the regu-
larly appointed master was unable to act.137 This statute also 
declared that no master in chancery should practice as a solicitor 
in the court in which he was to act as master. "An Act to provide 
for the appointment of Masters in Chancery" passed in 1828138 
divided the Territory into eleven districts, and directed the 
governor to nominate, and "by and with the advice and consent 
of the legislative council," appoint one or more masters for each 
district-two for the first district composed of Wayne County-
to hold office for three years. Acting under this statute Governor 
Cass appointed Robert Abbott and Charles W. Whipple for the 
first district.139 His choice of Whipple was questioned by "CA TO" 
in a letter published in the Detroit Gazette, October 9, 1828. 
After pointing out the importance of the office in the administra-
tion of justice, why, he asked, had the Governor appointed 
"a youth, scarce arrived at the years of manhood, who 
has but just commenced the study of law, who can have no 
pretensions to any knowledge of chancery law or practice, 
and wholly ignorant of the business incident to the office."140 
In a reply published October 16 Whipple called attention to the 
limited scope of the duties involved: 
"The business of a master, has been limited to the taking 
down of testimony, drafting reports on references made to 
him, with a view of ascertaining the amount due on mort-
gages and the like, and making sale of real estate under the 
decrees of the court." 
A similar letter signed "N" appeared in the same issue of the 
Gazette. Other letters followed, but after a month the matter 
was dropped. If the territorial Supreme Court lacked confidence 
in Whipple's ability to serve as a master, it does not appear from 
the records of cases involving foreclosure of mortgages, more 
cases of this kind being referred to him than to any other master. 
187 2 LAws OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN (reprint) 186 (1874). 
lSSid. at 668. 
189 July 2, 1828. JOURNAL OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 1st session, 5th Council, p. !15. 
William W. Petit was appointed "master commissioner in chancery, supreme, and Wayne 
County courts" June 22, 1818. Id. at 19. 
140 A son of Major John Whipple who came to the Northwest Territory shortly after 
1796 and resided in Detroit until 1830, Charles W. had been a student at West Point 
1822-1827; dismissed July 15, 1827, "deficient in Engineering and Artillery" (records United 
States Military Academy). 
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And it may be of interest to note that he became a member of 
the state Supreme Court in 1839. 
Specific Performance. Trusts 
The final journal entry in the first chancery case heard by 
the territorial Supreme Court (1807)141 is brief enough to be 
quoted in full: 
"The bill of the complainants charges that they had sold 
a lot and house in the old tovm of Detroit to the defendant, 
and states the consideration, and prays a specific performance 
to be enforced; the answer states that previous to the transfer 
of the property by a conveyance the house was consumed 
by the fire, which destroyed the to,rn of Detroit, and that 
the complainants had not even at that time the legal title. 
The case having been fully heard on the bill, answer, exhibits, 
and testimony of the parties, and on the arguments of their 
respective counsel it is thereupon ordered and decreed by the 
Court that the bill be dismissed, and that the defendant re-
cover his costs." 
The fire referred to had occurred in 1805 shortly before Detroit 
was to become the seat of the new tenitorial government, and, 
because of a decision to lay out the town according to a new plan, 
o,;rnership of particular lots was uncertain until the plan could 
be put into effect. It was not this uncertainty, however, that was 
referred to by the defendant, but a lack of legal title at the time 
of the fire. Whether specific performance was denied because a 
substantial part of the property had been destroyed, or because 
of lack of legal title, or both, does not appear. That both reasons 
for denying specific performance were relied on in argument is 
sho,;rn by briefs in the handwriting of Solomon Sibley, counsel 
for defendant, found among his papers.142 Pointing out that 
plaintiffs' claim to title was based on a judicial sale of attached 
property, which under the Northwest statutes should have been 
sold for the benefit of all creditors, Sibley argued that a plaintiff 
praying for specific performance 
"I. Must shew that he is able to make a perfect deed-
Powel 2d 34 Mar lows Case - 2d P. Williams 198 & 199 -
"2d Must shew that he has done every thing on his part 
2d of Powel 19. 21. & 22-
141 Case 80, 1 TRANSACTIONS (1805-1814) 102 (1935). See also Case 44, id. at 75. 
142 Burton Historical Collection, Public Library, Detroit. 
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"3d The transaction must be fair & without deception -
"4th If any thing hapen to the subjt matter of contract 
after the sale and before conveyance altering the value, it 
will be at the risk of the seller 1 P. Wil 61 & 62. 2 P. Wil 
220 - Powel 2d 34 -" 
Sibley was willing to concede that "if the vendor had a good title 
at the time of the agreement made, then court of equity will 
consider as executed," but insisted that the agreement in present 
case was not "a complete contract," hence the property remained 
at the "risk of the vendor." 
The usual suit for specific performance was not to compel the 
acceptance of a conveyance,143 but to compel the performance of 
an agreement to convey. A suit of this type commenced in 1817, 
but not decided until 1826, involved an agreement by a partner 
to transfer to the partnership two city lots, a memorandum of 
the agreement being entered in the partnership books.144 The 
partnership was dissolved in 1809, and the partner who made the 
agreement died in 1813 without making a conveyance. In an ac-
tion by the surviving partner against the administrator and heirs 
of the deceased partner for a conveyance to him of a half interest 
in the lots, the court decreed "in favour of Complainant." Notes 
in the hand·writing of Judge Sibley contain references to Watson 
on Partnership, Newland on Contracts, and to Reeve's lectures 
on "Baron and Femme" and other topics including "the Powers 
of the Courts of Chancery.'' The reference to Watson was to 
the rule in equity that where partners are joint tenants the right 
of survivorship does not prevail, the partners being tenants in 
common in equity; that the legal title is held in trust for those 
beneficially interested regardless of lapse of time. The decree, 
though ordered filed, is not with the numerous papers in the 
file, making it impossible to refer to the exact language used in 
decreeing the conveyance. In a suit for specific performance de-
cided in 182!145 the court decreed that the defendant (executrix) 
" ... make, sign, seal & have ready to deliver a good and suf-
ficient deed of conveyance of and for the said lot & tract of 
land & premises ... as an estate of inheritance in fee simple 
forever, to the said Complainant ... on or before the expira-
tion of six months . . . & that the said defendants who are 
143 Only one other case of this type appears in the records, Case 1246, 1 TRANSAcrIONS 
(1825-1836) 87 (1940). 
144 Case 567, 1 id. (1814-1824) at 85 (1938). 
145 Case 599, id. at 99. 
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... under the age of twenty one years do join in said deed 
of conveyance by their said guardian And that the said De-
fendants do then deliver to the said Complainant the said 
deed of conveyance." 
83 
The decree further provided that the parties appear at the next 
term of the court, at which time the complainant might except 
to the deed of conveyance or to the title conveyed. 
In a suit to enforce an implied trust commenced in 1816, de-
cided in 1830, the court decreed that the defendant make a con-
veyance to the complainant within three months, and upon his 
failure to do so 
"That then this DECREE shall of itself operate as a conveyance 
unless and untill the said Complainant shall thereafter Elect 
to take such further and other measures as may coerce the 
Execution thereof -"146 
Authority to make this type of decree was given by "An Act di-
recting the mode of proceeding in Chancery" approved April 12, 
1827,147 section 35 of the Act providing: 
"That a court of chancery shall have power to pass the 
title to real estate, by a decree, without any other act to be 
done on the part of the defendant or defendants, when, in 
their judgment, it shall be the proper mode to carry their 
decrees into effect; and such decree being recorded in the 
records of the register of the county where such real estate is 
situated, shall, while in force, be as effectual to transfer the 
same, as the deed of the defendant or defendants." 
A decree entered in 1833, reciting non-compliance with a decree 
for specific performance entered in 1828, ordered 
"that the aforesaid decree shall be considered and taken in 
all Courts of Law and Equity to have the same operation & 
Effect & be as available, as if such releases and conveyances 
had been Executed conformably to such decree.''148 
The "implied trust" enforced in the suit referred to above149 
was, according to complainant's brief, created when complainant's 
property, levied on in 1807 to satisfy a judgment in favor of the 
United States, was bid in by an attorney for defendant's brother 
140 Case 546, id. at 76. 
U7 2 LAws OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN (reprint) 517 (1874). 
148 Case 600, 1 TRANSACfIONS (1814-1824) 99. 
uo Note 146 supra. 
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who had advanced money to pay the judgment, the attorney 
later conveying to the brother who conveyed to defendant. The 
bill of complaint alleged that complainant suffered the sale for 
the better security of the money borrowed; that defendant took 
the property without consideration and with knowledge of the 
original arrangement; that defendant is now indebted to com-
plainant in a sum greater than that owed by complainant. The 
brief, found among the papers of the Judge Woodbridge150 and 
no doubt submitted to him at the time the case was argued, 
states: 
"I. That in this transaction there was an implied trust, 
and this Court will enforce it - . . . The property having 
been purchased with the [ money of] Complainant, he in 
whose name the deed was taken, is a mere trustee for the 
complainant even in the absence of an agreement to that 
effect: and it may be proved that the money was so paid by 
any memm or note of the nominal purchaser, or by parol. 
"2. John Hoffman coming into property bound by a 
trust with notice shall be considered a trustee - Whoever so 
comes into possession, is considered as Trustee, with respect 
to that special property -
"3. The possession of complainant is notice to John Hoff-
man of the interest and the extent of that interest which the 
complainant had in the same property, and the purchaser is 
bound to admit every claim of the tenant which he could en-
force against the vendor .... " 
In support of these propositions complainant's solicitor, Fraser, 
cited Maddock, Practice of the High Court of Chancery; Abridg-
ment of English Equity Cases; reports of English chancery cases 
(Atkyns, P. Williams, Vernon, Vesey Jr.); reports of Irish chanc-
ery cases (Schoale and Lefroy); reports of New York chancery 
cases (Johnson).151 The court "considered that the conveyance 
150 Burton Historical Collection, Public Library, Detroit. 
151 Complainant's solicitor, Alexander D. Fraser, was admitted to practice before the 
territorial Supreme Court in 1825. Writing in 1870, Charles Lanman (THE RED BooK 
OF MICHIGAN 441) sketched Fraser's career: "He was born in Inverness, Scotland, January 
20, 1796, and was educated at the Inverness Academy. In 1813 he began the study of law; 
two years afterwards he removed to Edinburgh, and prosecuted his studies in the office 
of the Writer to the Signet, and attended the law lectures of the University; and in 1819 
he sailed for America and landed at Savannah, Georgia; came to the bar in Alabama, where 
he spent two years, and then removed to Vincennes, Indiana. He practiced his profession 
for two years in Indiana and Illinois; and in 1823 he arrived at Detroit. • . • By common 
consent, he is to-day looked upon by his colleagues at the bar as the leading lawyer of 
Michigan." 
1960] CHANCERY ON THE AMERICAN FRONTIER 85 
of the premises to George Hoffman in his life time and the sub-
sequent conveyance by him to John Hoffman his brother for a 
good consideration only & with a knowledge of the rights of the 
Complainant are to be taken as conveyances in trust for the use 
of the Complainant." After a master in chancery reported that 
the sum originally advanced exceeded complainant's account 
against defendant by a small amount, the court decreed that on 
payment of this amount the defendant should make a conveyance 
to the complainant. 
Of the 28 suits for specific performance commenced in the 
territorial Supreme Court, 20 were for specific performance alone; 
the others for specific performance plus additional relief such as 
accounting, cancellation, injunction, and receiver. In all of these 
cases discovery to some extent was sought, and in some, the en-
forcement of a trust. Suits in which the principal relief was the 
establishment and enforcement of a trust (9 in number) did not 
involve merely a claim to the trust property, but included prayers 
for accounting, annulment, cancellation, injunction, receiver, and 
so on. A reader interested in seeing the pleadings in a typical suit 
for specific performance will find a complete set recorded at length 
in the Chancery Journal, now available in print.1112 Opinions in 
two of the cases, one by Judge Sibley in 1829 and the other by 
Chancellor Farnsworth after Michigan became a state, are also 
available in print.1113 
Accounting and Other Relief 
In many of the 240 chancery cases commenced in the terri-
torial Supreme Court an accounting was prayed for, but in only 
1112 2 TRANSACTIONS (1814-1824) 489-508 (1938). In this case the court, after "mature 
deliberation," decreed that the "Bill do from henceforth stand absolutely dismissed." In 
opposition to a petition for a rehearing Fraser filed an elaborate brief citing Maddock, 
Chancery Practice; Harrison, Chancery Practice; Mitford (Redesdale), Chancery Pleading; 
Cooper, Equity Pleading; Fonblanque (Ballow), Equity; Blake, New York Chancery Prac-
tice; Phillips, Evidence; Roberts, Statute of Frauds; Equity Cases Abridgment; English 
chancery reports (Atkyns, Vesey Jr.); Irish Chancery Reports (Schoale and Lefroy); 
United States Reports (Wheaton); Virginia Reports (Mumford). Notes in the hand-
writing of Judge Sibley summarizing Fraser's arguments will be found in I TRANSACTIONS 
(1814-1824) 289 (1938). 
1113 Case 903, I TRANSACTIONS (1814-1824) 235 (1938); opinion printed in I TRANS-
ACTIONS (1825-1836) 370 (1940). Case 1409, id. at 137; opinion printed in Harr. Ch. Rep. 
(Mich.) 31 (1836-42). Sibley's opinion was concerned with the notice required to bind heirs, 
and purchasers from heirs. Farnsworth's opinion dealt with the statute of frauds, and the 
effect of inadequacy of price. In his unpublished Judicial History of Michigan (1886) 
(copy in Law Library, University of Michigan), Campbell referred to Judge Sibley as 
"a man of great ability and wisdom" who had "universal confidence." For Campbell's 
appraisal of Farnsworth, see supra note 123. 
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a few - about a half dozen - was accounting for principal or 
only relief demanded. An amended bill in a suit of the latter 
type, commenced in 1822, will be outlined to serve as an illustra-
tion:1114 
AMENDED BILL 
Complainants: Robert Abbott and five others, children and 
devisees under will, of James Abbott, and under will of his wife, 
Mary. Defendant: James Abbott, Jr. 
1789. James Abbott formed a partnership with son Robert-
two-thirds and one-third. 
1798. New partnership-James, Sr., Robert (orator), and James, 
Jr. (defendant)-one-third each. For his share James, Jr. owed James, 
Sr. $4,557.95. 
1799. James, Sr. made will; one-third to wife, Mary; two-thirds 
to six children-one-sixth each. 
1800. James, Sr. died. James, Jr. became executor of will, and 
took possession of estate. Has never accounted, and still has property, 
books, papers, etc. 
1813. Wife, Mary, made will giving her one-third to same children. 
James, Jr., named as one of her executors, refused to act as such, 
but on her death took possession of all her property. 
Prayer 
I. For answer to bill and numerous special interrogatories. 
2. That will of James, Sr. be established and carried into exe-
cution by decree of Supreme Court. 
3. For account of rents, profits, interest, debts, funeral expenses, 
etc., so residue may be ascertained and one-sixth of two-thirds paid 
to each orator. 
4. For accounting of money owed partnership-one-sixth of two-
thirds of $4,557.95. 
5. That defendant set forth and discover all real estate, so fair 
division may be made by Court. 
6. That defendant produce all books of account, papers, deeds, 
bonds, etc., relating to estate, and deposit same with a list thereof. 
7. That defendant set forth and specify amounts of bonds, 
mortgages, accounts, etc. 
8. That defendant set forth and partition land under decree 
of this Court-one-third to Robert and one-sixth of two-thirds residue 
to each orator. 
9. That all and every the discovery and relief prayed for re estate 
of James, Sr. be decreed re estate of his wife, Mary. 
IO. Further relief as may seem proper. 
II. Subpoena under a certain penalty. 
August 26, 1829. ALEX D. FRASER Solicitor 
lM Case 905, 1 TRANSACTIONS (1814-1824) 237 (1938). 
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Prior to the filing of the amended bill the court had sustained 
a demurrer to the original bill, after overruling a plea which had 
challenged the propriety of compelling discovery. The grounds 
of demurrer appear in the defendant's brief and in an opinion 
written by Judge Sibley, both found among his papers and now 
available in print.155 The briefs and the opinion fairly illustrate 
the care with which complicated chancery cases were considered, 
and the broad range of the authorities relied on as precedents. 
Among the grounds of demurrer argued in the above case 1vas 
one which challenged the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to 
deal with matters relating to wills and the administration of de-
cedents' estates - matters exclusively within the jurisdiction of 
the probate courts. After pointing out that courts of chancery 
had jurisdiction concurrent with courts of law "in matters of 
account," Judge Sibley was "not prepared to say that there are 
not facts charged in the present Bill proper for the consideration 
of a Court of Chancery over which a Court of Probate could not 
sustain jurisdiction or grant complete relief." In 1807, before 
jurisdiction over persons mentally incompetent was vested in the 
probate courts,15° the Supreme Court "sitting in chancery" ap-
pointed a guardian for a person found to be "a lunatic;" and, 
in a later proceeding, decreed that the person had been "restored 
to his senses."157 In the second proceeding the Supreme Court 
"sitting in chancery" ordered that a jury be called "in the Su-
preme Court, sitting at law" to inquire into the matter and that 
the inquest be returned to the Supreme Court "sitting in chanc-
ery.'' 
In addition to the types of chancery relief previously referred 
to in this paper (accounting, determination of sanity, divorce, 
enforcement of trusts, injunction against tort, injunction against 
proceedings at law, mortgage foreclosure, ne exeat, specific per-
formance) prayers will be found for appointment of receiver, can-
cellation of deed, conveyance and re-conveyance of land, delivery 
of papers, dissolution of partnership, quieting title, rescission of 
commercial instruments, rescission of conveyance, and so on. Ex-
cept where jurisdiction of matters previously chancery had been 
conferred on the probate courts,158 the territorial Supreme Court 
155 Id. (1825-18!!6) at 378, 380. 
1511 l LAws OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN (reprint) 376 (1871). 
157 Case 87, 1 TRANSACTIONS (1805-1814) 106 (1935). 
1118 See Blume, Probate and Administration on the American Frontier, 58 MICH. L. 
Rzv. 210, 230 (1959). 
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exercised all the jurisdiction of a full-fledged court of chancery, 
and conducted its affairs accordingly. 
Conformity to Rules and Proceedings of English Chancery 
The Ordinance of 1787, applicable to Michigan Territory, as-
sured the inhabitants of "judicial proceedings according to the 
course of the common law." In 1827, after Congress had provided 
that the judges of Michigan should possess "a chancery, as well 
as common law, jurisdiction," the Legislative Council enacted 
that the Supreme Court of the territory should have jurisdiction 
"in cases properly cognizable by a court of chancery, in which a 
plain, adequate, and complete remedy cannot be had at law," and 
that the proceedings in the court, where not regulated by the 
statutes of the Territory, should be regulated "by the judges 
thereof, conforming to the rules and proceedings established by 
courts of chancery in England, so far as the same shall be con-
sistent with the laws and constitution of the United States, and 
the laws of the Territory of Michigan."159 This reference to 
English chancery practice was similar to that made in the Federal 
Equity Rules of 1822.160 
"XXXIII. In all cases where the rules prescribed by this 
court, or by the circuit court, do not apply, the practice of the 
circuit court shall be regulated by the practice of the high 
court of chancery in England." 
After 1810 no English statute was in force in Michigan except, 
perhaps, as a part of the common law.161 Judge Woodward was 
of opinion that the common law in force was the English com-
mon law of 1189.162 Judge Woodbridge noted that the common 
law had been "lopped off" by the Revolution.163 In his opinion 
the common law of the Territory was the English common law 
of 1776 unaffected by English statutes. According to Judge Sibley 
the common law referred to in the Ordinance of 1787 was the 
150 "An Act directing the mode of proceeding in chancery," 2 LAws OF THE TERRITORY 
OF MICHIGAN (reprint) 517 (1874). 
160 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) xxi. 
161 See "Act to repeal all acts of the Parliament of England, and of the Parliament 
of Great Britain, within the Territory of Michigan in the United States of America, and 
for other purposes." (1810), I LAws OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN (reprint) 900 (1871). 
162 1 TRANSACTIONS (1814-1824) 436 (1938). 
163 Id. (1825-1836) at 308. 
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English common law of 1776 as modified by English statutes 
enacted prior to that date.164 In contrast with these and other 
conflicting views as to what common law was in force, stands the 
clear guide to chancery practice set out in the Federal Equity 
Rules of 1822, and in the territorial statute of 1827. Chancery 
practice not regulated by statute or court rule was to conform to 
the current English practice - not to the practice of some earlier 
period. To have access to the designated source, it was necessary 
to have the latest English texts and cases. The result was supposed 
to be a system of chancery practice closely paralleling that of con-
temporary England. 
Determination of whether the chancery practice of Michigan 
Territory actually paralleled that of England would require a 
study far more extensive than the one presented here. Determina-
tion of whether the judges and fa~vyers had access to the latest 
English texts and cases has been attempted, but, due to difficulties 
in compiling a complete list of authorities cited and in establish-
ing what books were actually in the Territory, has been only 
partially accomplished. The list of authorities set forth below 
has been compiled from the few chancery opinions and briefs 
found in the Court's files, and from a greater number found among 
the personal papers of individual judges and Ia-ivyers. As we must 
assume that other authorities were cited in chancery opinions and 
briefs not now kno·wn, the list is enlightening but most likely 
not complete. 
English abridgments and digests 
Bacon, Bridgment, vol. 2 
Comyn, Digest, vol. 2 (chancery) 
Condensed Reports ( chancery) vols. 2, 4 
Cruise, Real Property Digest, vol. 1 
Equity Cases Abridgment, vols. 1-2 
Fitzherbert, Natura Brevium 
Hammond, Digest of Equity Reports 
Jacob, Dictionary of English Law, vol. 5 
Viner, Abridgment (law and equity) vol. 4 
.American abridgments and digests 
Dane, Abridgment of American Law, vol. 1 
Ingersoll, Abridgment of Acts of Congress 
Johnson, Digest of New York Cases, vol. 1 
Swift, Digest of Connecticut Laws, vols. 1-2 
164Jd. at !HI. 
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English reports 
Ambler (chancery) 
Atkyns (chancery) vols. 1-3 
Bosanquet and Puller, vol. 1 
Brown (chancery) vols. 1, 3 
Burrow, vols. 3-5 
Douglas, vol. 1 
East, vol. 8 
Espinassi, vol. 2 
Moseley (chancery) 
Peere Williams (chancery) vols. 1-3 
Salkeld, vol. 1 
Strange, vol. 1 
Vernon (chancery) vols. 1-2 
Vesey, Sr. (chancery) vols. 1-2 
Vesey, Jr. (chancery) vols. 1-16, 18-19 
Vesey and Beames (chancery) vols. 1-2 
American reports 
Binney, Pennsylvania, vol. 5 
Caines, New York, vols. 1-2 
Cowen, New York, vols. 2, 9 
Cranch, United States, vols. 1, 7 
Dallas, United States, vol. 1 (Pa.) 
Desaussure, South Carolina, vols. 2-3 
Hening and Mumford, Virginia, vols. 1, 3-4 
Johnson, New York (chancery) vols. 1-7 
Johnson, New York (law) vols. 1, 3, 4-5, 7, 9-10, 12-15, 18-19 
Massachusetts, vols. 1, 3-4, 6, 11 
Mumford, Virginia, vols. 1, 4-5 
Paige, New York (chancery) vols. 1-2, 4 
Peters, United States, vols. 1, 3, 7 
Randolph, Virginia, vol. 2 
Sergeant and Rawle, Pennsylvania, vol. 7 
Wheaton, United States, vols. 1-4, 7, 9, 12 
English treatises 
Blackstone, Commentaries, vols. 1-4 
Chitty, Practice, vol. 2 
Clancey, Husband and wife (law and equity) 
Coke, Commentary upon Littleton, vol. 1 
Cooper, Equity Pleading 
Eden (Baron Henley), In junctions 
Equity Draftsman (F. Van Heythuysen) 
Fonblanque, Equity, vols. 1-2 
Francis, Maxims of Equity 
Gow, Partnership 
Harrison, Chancery Practice, vols. 1-2 
[ Vol. 59 
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English treatises (Continued) 
Hinde, Chancery Practice 
Kyd, Awards 
Maddock, Chancery Practice, vols. 1-2 
Mitford (Redesdale), Chancery Pleading 
Montagu, Set-off (law and equity) 
Newland, Contracts (equity) 
Newland, Chancery Practice 
Phillips, Evidence 
Powell, Contracts, vols. I, 2 (equity) 
Powell, Mortgages 
Reeves, History, vols. 3-4 
Roberts, Statute of Frauds 
St. Germain, Doctor and Student (chancery) 
Sugden, Vendors and Purchasers 
Toller, Executors and Administrators 
Watson, Partnership 
American treatises 
Blake, New York Chancery Practice 
Cowen, Civil Jurisdiction of New York Justice of Peace 
Kent, Commentaries, vol. 2 
Reeve, Baron and Femme, Powers of Courts of Chancery, etc. 
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In addition to these authorities, references in at least five chancery 
cases were made to Schoales and Lefroy's reports of cases de-
termined in the High Court of Chancery in Ireland (vols. 1-2), 
and in at least one case to Erskine's Principles of the Law of 
Scotland. 
Some writers have asserted that judges and lawyers on the 
American Frontier relied almost entirely on Blackstone's Com-
mentaries, and may be inclined to question the actual presence 
on the Frontier of the books listed above. As a check against 
the possibility that some or all of the citations referred to might 
have been made without physical access to the books cited, Re-
search Associate Elizabeth Brown has made a preliminary in-
vestigation of sources other than the opinions and briefs to ascer-
tain what law books were present at or near the seat of the 
territorial government within the period of the present study. 
Her preliminary report reads in part as follows: 
In my attempt to discover what law books were physically 
present at or near the seat of government of Michigan Territory 
within the territory period (1805-1836), no weight was given to 
citations found in attorneys' notes and briefs, or in the notes and 
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opinions of judges. This policy was adopted in the interest of 
accuracy, although in many instances the citations strongly sug-
gest that the ·writer had actual access to the books cited. Proof of 
physical presence has been sought in sources such as the following: 
I. Inventories of estates of deceased lawyers and judges; 
2. Invoices and other evidence of book purchases; 
3. Contemporary references to books said to be present; 
4. Newspaper advertisements for the return of missing books; 
5. Extant books containing the autograph of a territorial 
attorney or judge. 
Prior to 1840 it was usual to include in the inventory of a 
decedent's estate a list of the books found among his effects.16 is 
The two territorial lawyers said to have had the largest law 
libraries, William vVoodbridge and Alexander D. Fraser, died 
after 1840 and, unfortunately, the titles of their books were not 
included in the inventories of their estates. Judge Woodward 
died before 1840, but had disposed of most of his books before 
his death.166 
Illustrative of a contemporary reference to books said to be 
present is the following letter dated at Monroe, Michigan, De-
cember 14, 1827: 
"We have in town most of the elementary works in ordi-
nary use. Esp[inasse] & Selwyns Digests the Digest of Mass 
& N. York Reports- books on Evidence Chitty, Saunders, 
Wentworths, Pleading, Tidd Seldon & Archibald Practice-
Chitty on Crim Law and some of the English reports."167 
An illustration of an advertisement for the return of a missing 
book will be found in the Detroit Journal and Courier of April 
29, 1835. 
From a fairly complete card file kept by the Law Library of 
The University of Michigan of books catalogued or recatalogued 
after 1927, it is possible to locate those books in the Library 
which contain autographs of previous owners. This group con-
tains several books once owned by lawyers of the territorial period. 
165 For an example of such an inventory, see Blume, Probate and Administration on 
the American Frontier, 58 MICH. L. REv. 209, 230, n. 86 (1959). For an example of an 
invoice of a book purchase, see Blume, Civil Procedure on the American Frontier, 56 
MICH. L. REV. 162, 166-7 (1957). 
166 See Brown, Augustus Brevoort Woodward, Afan of Property, 40 MICHIGAN 
HISfORY MAGAZINE 190-202 Gune 1956). 
167 WOODBRIDGE PAPERS, Burton Historical Collection, Detroit, Michigan, cited in l 
'TRANSACTIONS (1814-1824) 35 (1938). 
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Relying on sources of proof such as the above, I have made a 
preliminary list of law books actually present at or near the seat 
of the territorial government between 1805 and 1836. As it has 
been impossible in the time available to examine all the sources, 
of necessity the list is tentative and incomplete, but all books not 
clearly identifiable as law books have been omitted.168 
In comparing my list with the list of citations made by Pro-
fessor Blume at pp. 89-91 supra, it is necessary to bear in mind that 
his list is limited to citations in chancery cases, while mine in-
cludes all law books found to have been physically present. The 
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168 The inventories and book orders contained references to at least thirteen legal 
treatises which cannot be identified positively. In some cases, no author was listed, and 
the title was so vague as to prove of little assistance. Examples of this type of listing 
include Civil Officer and Notes on Law (4 vols.) ordered by William Woodbridge in 
1806, Law Marine listed in the inventory of tl1e estate of Cyprian Stevens who died in 1830, 
Maritime Law (2 vols.) and Theorie des Loix owned by Father Gabriel Richard, a treatise 
on Certiorari and four volumes of the Newgate Calendar listed in the estate of Henry C. 
Cole who died in 1836, and Lawyer's Guide listed in the inventory of the Andrew G. 
Whitney estate in 1826. Another type of inadequate reference is found where some in-
formation as to author and title are noted, but full bibliographical data for sufficient 
identification cannot be established. For example, the Andrew G. Whitney estate listed 
Cooper's Justinian, Clark's Commentaries, and Proctor's Practice. 
100 AMERICAN CLERK'S MAGAZINE, vol. l; ATTORNEY'S COMl'LETE POCKET BOOK, vol. I; 
ATIORNEY's MANUAL; ARCHBOLD, PRAcrrCE, vols. 1-2; BECK, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE; BACHE, 
JUSTICE'S MANUAL, vols. 1-2; BURNS, REcISTRUM EcCLESIAE PAROCHIALIS; CAINES, PRAcrrCE; 
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If the proportion of the iceberg which shows above water to 
that which is underneath the surface should be even partially 
applicable to the proportion of law books known to be present 
CALDWELL, .ARBITRATION; CHITIT, BILLS OF EXCHANGE; CHITIT, CRIMINAL LAW, vols. 1-!1; 
CHrITY, PLEADING; CHITIT, PRAcnCE, vols. 1-3; CLANCY, EQUITABLE RIGHTS OF MARRm> 
WOMEN; COMYN, CoNTRACTS, vols. 1-2; CONDUCTOR GENERALIS; CROMPTON, PRACTICE, vols. 
1-2; CROMPTON, PRAcrICE COMMON-PLACED, vols. 1-2; CURRY, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES; 
ERSKINE, SPEECHES; EVANS, EssAY; EVERY MAN HIS OWN LAWYER; FELL, MERCANTILE GUARAN· 
TIES; FESSENDEN, PATENTS; GILBERT, EVIDENCE; GOULD, PLEADING; GRAHAM, EssAY ON NEW 
TRIALS; HALE, COMMON LAW, vols. 1-2; HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN, vols. 1-2; HAWKINS, 
PLEAS OF THE CROWN, vols. 1-2; HIGHMORE, BAIL; HOFFMAN, CHANCERY PRAcnCE; How-
ARD, TREATISE ON EXCHEQUER IN IRELAND, vols. 1-2; HULL'S TRIAL; IMPEY, PRAcnCE; J£F-
FERSON, PARLIAMENTARY PRAcrICE; JEREMY, LAW OF CARRIERS; JONES, BAILMENT; JUSTINIAN, 
INSTITUTES; KAMES, LAW TRACTS; KENT, CoMMENTARIES, vols. 1, 3-4; KYD, BILLS OF EX-
CHANGE; LIVERMORE, PRINCIPAL AND AGENT; MACOMB, MARTIAL I.Aw; MACNALLY, EVIDENCE; 
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in the Territory of Michigan to that which in all probability was 
present, it is clear that the lawyers in and near Detroit during 
this period had and used an adequate and even extensive work-
ing law library. There is every reason to believe that when they 
cited references, they had checked the sources, and the apposite-
ness and relevancy of the citations to the statements supported 
lends additional credence to the belief that they not only had 
the tools of their profession available but employed them with 
skill and discrimination. 
As in the other studies of this series an effort has been made 
to discover what influence, if any, the Frontier had on the de-
velopment of American law. When the court involved was or-
ganized (1805) it was beyond the line of continuous settlement; 
was on the line in mid-existence; and barely within it at the end 
(1836). The records of the 240 chancery cases examined are not 
complete in all instances, but sufficiently complete to give a fair 
picture of the procedure followed. One looking for Frontier in-
fluence will find instead of evidence of "rough and ready justice" 
long and complicated equity bills many of them containing all 
the features of the classical English bills, and one, at least, run-
ning more than 100 pages; complicated answers under oath many 
giving full discovery; extensive use of masters in chancery; care-
fully-drawn chancery decrees. Instead of Blackstone, he will find 
numerous references to the principal chancery authorities of the 
time; instead of experimentation, a close adherence to precedent. 
Instead of summary justice he will find instances of long delays, 
some cases pending many years before final disposition. He may, 
as he explores the intricacies of the records, forget that he is ex-
amining the records of a frontier court. 
182 Acrs OF CONGRESS, 5 numbers; AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, 8 vols.; CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES; DEBATES IN THE SENATE ON THE REPEAL OF THE JUDICIARY Acr; FEDERALIST, 
2 vols.; JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, 7 vols.; LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, 28 vols.; 
STATE PAPERS, JOURNALS, REPORTS OF COMIIIITl'EES, 37 vols.; SECRET JOURNALS OF THE CoN-
GRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, 4 vols.; SECRETARY OF STATE'S REPORTS, 
183 STATUTES OF CONNECTICUT; CIVIL CODE OF LOUISIANA; MASSACHUSETTS LAws; NEW 
YORK LAws, 15 vols.; NE'IV YORK STATE CONVENTION; RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
NEW YORK; LAws OF RHODE lsLAND. 
184 LAWS OF MICHIGAN, 17 vols.; LAws AND JOURNALS OF MICHIGAN, 16 vols.; LAws OF 
THE NORTHWEST TERRITORY. 
18G CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CoLOIIIBIA. 
96 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 59 
With only two or three exceptions, the judges of the terri-
torial Supreme Court were well-educated lawyers, and at times, 
especially the last eight years, the entire bench was highly com-
petent. At all times adequately trained lawyers were members 
of the bar. While, as noted before, it is not possible in a study of 
this brevity to show in detail how closely the chancery practice 
of the Territory paralleled that of England, or that of New York, 
it can be said that the practice was carefully developed in ap-
parent conformity to the rules and proceedings of English chan-
cery, and served as a solid foundation for the chancery practice 
-0f the state. 
